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A Moment in Human Development:
Legal Protection, Ethical Standards
and Social Policy on the Selective
Non-Treatment of Handicapped
Neonates
Larry Gostin*
ABSTRACT
Selective non-treatment decisions involving severely handicapped neo-
nates have recently come under renewed judicial and legislative scrutiny.
In this Article, the Author examines the legal, ethical and social consid-
erations attendant to the non-treatment decision. In Part II of this Article
the Author discusses the predominant ethical viewpoints relating to this
issue and proposes a new moral standard based on personal interests.
Part III presents a survey of the jurisprudence relating to selective
non-treatment decisions. Parts IV and V of this Article provide a critical
examination of the recently enacted Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, a
federal legislative initiative designed to regulate treatment decisions
relating to handicapped infants. The Author suggests that the ethical
standards and treatment criteria proposed in this Article may prove
useful to courts seeking to balance the handicapped neonate's constitu-
tional right to privacy with the requirements of the new federal law.
I. INTRODUCTION
A fetus in the womb, once viable,' is considered in law to be deserving
of protection. The viable fetus, even if there is certainty that it is handi-
* Senior Fellow in Health Law, Harvard University School of Public Health. B.A.,
summa cum laude, 1971, State University of New York at Brockport; J.D., 1974, Duke
University. The author wrote this Article while a Visiting Fellow in Law and Medicine, Oxford
University, Centre for Criminological Research. The author would like to acknowledge the
assistance he received from William Curran, Frances Glessner Lee Professor of Legal Medi-
cine, Harvard School of Medicine; Derek Russell Davis, Dean of the Faculty of Medicine and
Emeritus Professor of Psychiatry, Bristol University; Professors Peter Mittler and Cliff Cun-
ningham of the Hester Adrian Research Centre for the Study of Learning Processes in the
Mentally Handicapped, University of Manchester; Professor Dr. Bernd Schulte, Max-Planck-
Institut, Munich; Gunnar Dybwad, Professor Emeritus of Human Development, Florence
Heller School for Advanced Studies in Social Welfare, Brandeis University; and Professor
Joan Bicknell, St. Thomas, Medical School, University of London.
A fetus in a human being refers to the products of conception from the beginning of the
third month of pregnancy until birth. The term viability is medically applied to the human
fetus from about the 28th week of gestation at which stage it may be capable of survival.
CONCISE OXFORD MEDICAL DICTIONARY 235 (Corgi ed. 1982).
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capped, has a constitutional right to privacy and must be protected from
harm .2
The young child is regarded as a person, and although its parents have
great discretion, the child is protected by constitutional guarantees as well
as state and federal child welfare legislation. Any parental decision affect-
ing the child's welfare is measured against the well established legal princi-
ple of the child's best interests, i.e., the interests the child would follow if he
or she were competent. Thus, even if a child suffers from a severe
handicap-whether it existed at birth or arose later as a result of accident
or disease-the parents have a responsibility to protect it from serious
harm where recognized effective medical interventions are available.3
There has emerged, however, a jurisprudential and ethical view which
appears to demarcate a highly vulnerable moment in human development
where traditional child protection principles are seriously diminished. Dur-
ing this short period, days or weeks following birth, it is argued, a parent
should have the right to allow the withholding of feasible life-saving medi-
cal procedures from the severely handicapped neonate.
The practice of keeping treatment decisions affecting infants within
the domain of the parents and attending physician is, in fact, not new and it
has gained strong support in the legal and medical literature.4 That prac-
2 The constitutional underpinning of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was that the right
to privacy includes freedom of personal choice in certain matters of marriage and family. See
also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). Familial or parental choice in effectuating the
constitutional right to privacy is, however, only one interest to be balanced among others;
from the moment of viability, the principal interest is that of the infant. It is the thesis of this
essay that this balancing of interests is not fundamentally altered by either the fact of the birth
of a severely handicapped infant or the long-term worth of the life to be protected. Although
the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 156-58, held that a fetus was not a person
under the Fourteenth Amendment, it indicated that a newborn, and by implication a hand-
icapped newborn, is a person deserving of constitutional protection. See Commonwealth v.
Edelin, 371 Mass. 497, 359 N.E.2d 4 (1976) (conviction of a physician for manslaughter of an
aborted but arguably "live" fetus reversed because only a fetus "born alive outside its mother"
can be a "person"). For a discussion of the Edelin case see P. RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGE OF
LIFE: MEDICAL AND LEGAL INTERSECTIONS 94-141 (1978).
1 See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
4See BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, THE HANDBOOK OF MEDICAL ETHICS 29 (1980)
(amended by the BMA in 1983, 286 BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL 593, (1983); H. KUHSE & P.
SINGER, SHOULD THE BABY LIVE? THE PROBLEM OF HANDICAPPED INFANTS (1985); Davis,Ethical
Issues in Neonatal Care, in PARENT AND INFANT ATTACHMENT IN PREMATURE BABIES (J. Davis, M.
Richard & C. Robertson, eds. 1984); Englehardt, Ethical Issues in Aiding the Death of Young
Children, in KILLING AND LETTING DIE (B. Steinbeck, ed. 1980); T. Baldwin, Life and Death
in Newborn Special Care Units (March 1982) (available at Connecticut State Dept. of Health
Services); Campbell & Duff, Deciding the Care of Severely Malformed or Dying Infants, 5 J. MED.
ETHICS 65 (1979); Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care Nursery, 289
NEW ENG. J. MEn. 890 (1973); Englehardt, Euthanasia and Children; The Injury of Continued
Existence, 83 J. PEDIATRICS, 170 (1973); Fletcher, Abortion, Euthanasia and Care of Defective
Newborns, 292 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 75 (1975); Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On
State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645, 651-61 (1977); Goldstein, Not for the
Law to Approve or Disapprove-A Comment on Professor Mnookin's Paper, 1984 ARIZ. STATE L.J.
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tice came under the full gaze of public scrutiny in the "Baby Doe" case, 5
where the Indiana Supreme Court approved a parental decision to with-
hold treatment for a remediable tracheo-esophageal fistula6 in an infant
born with Down's Syndrome.
The Baby Doe case has been used as the moral underpinning for the
Child Abuse Amendments of 1984. This legislation and its accompanying
regulations7 intimately control medical and parental decision-making at the
685; Harris, Ethical Problems in the Management of Some Severely Handicapped Children, 7 J. MED.
ETHICS 117 (1981); Kuhse, A Modern Myth that Letting Die is Not the Intentional Causation of Death:
Some Reflections on the Trial and Acquittal of Dr. Leonard Arthur, 1 J. OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY 21
(1984); Lorber, Ethical Problems in the Management of Myelomeningocele and Hydrocephalus, 10J.
RoY'L COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF LONDON 47 (1975); McCormick, To Save or Let Die-The
Dilemma of Modern Medicine, 229 J.A.M.A. 172 (1974); Myer, Protecting the Best Interests of the
Child: Is the State a Necessary Blunt Instrument, 1984 ARIZONA STATE L.J. 627; Smith, Quality of
Life, Sanctity of Creation: Palliative or Apotheosis, 63 NEB. L. REV. 709 (1984); Tooley, Abortion and
Infanticide, 2 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFE. 37 (1972); Williams, Down's Syndrome and the Duty to
Preserve Life, 131 NEW L.J. 1020 (1981); Williams, Down's Syndrome and the Doctor's Responsibility,
133 NEW L.J. 1040 (1981); Comment, Baby Doe Decisions: Modern Society's Sins of Omission, 63
NEB. L. REV. 888 (1984). Other commentators have argued for careful control over non-
treatment decisions. See Burt, Authorizing Death for Anomolous Newborns, in GENETICS AND TrHE
LAW 435 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas, eds. 1976); Freund, Mongoloids and "Mercy Killing," in
ETHICS IN MEDICINE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS 536 (S.J.
Raiser, A.J. Dyck & J. Curran, eds. 1977); P. Ramsey, supra note 2, at 189-227; A. Shearer,
EVERYBODY'S ETHICS: WHAT FUTURE FOR HANDICAPPED BABIES? (1984); Annas, "A Wonderful
Case and an Irrational Tragedy": The Phillip Becker Case Continues, 12 HAST. CEN. RPT. 25 (Feb.
1982); Brant & McNulty, Treating Defective Newborns: The Ethical Dilemma, 10 HUM. RTs. 34
(1982); Bridge & Bridge, The Brief Lye and Death of Christopher Bridge, I I HAST. CEN. RPT. 17
(Dec. 1981); Coburn, Morality and the Defective Newborn, 5J. MED. AND PHILOSOPHY 340 (1980);
Ellis, Letting Defective Babies Die: Who Decides? 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 393 (1982); Fost, Baby Doe:
Problems and Solutions, 1984 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 637; Gostin, Court of Appeal's Authorization of
Operation on Infant with Down Syndrome, THE LANCET 467 (August 29, 1981); Heymann &
Holtz, The Severely Defective Newborn: The Dilemma and Decision Process, 23 PUB. POLICY 381
(1975); Johnson, Selective Non-Treatment and Spina Bifida: A Case Study in Ethical Theory and
Application, 3 BIOETHICS QUART. 91 (1981); Johnson, Selective Non-Treatment of Defective New-
borns; An Ethical Analysis, 47 LINACRE QUART. 39 (1980); Longio, Withholding Treatment from
Defective Newborns: Who Decides and on What Criteria? 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 377 (1983); Morgan,
Quality of Life and the Malformed Child, 27 OXFORD MEDICAL SCHOOL GAZETTE 77 (1975);
Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 213,
263-68 (1975), Robertson & Fost, Passive Euthanasia of Defective Newborn Infants: Legal Consid-
erations, 88 J. PEDIATRICS 883 (1976); Shapiro, Medical Treatment oj Defective Newborns: An
Answer to the "Baby Doe" Dilemma, 20 HARV. J. LEGIS. 137 (1983); Note, Birth Defective Infants: A
Standard for Non-Treatment Decisions, 30 STAN. L. REV. 599 (1978).
5 in re the Treatment and Care of Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Ind. Cir. Ct., Apr. 12,
1982), cert. denied sub nom., Infant Doe v. Bloomington Hospital, 464 U.S. 961, (1983) [here-
inafter cited as Infant Doe.] See infra text accompanying notes 78-79.
6 A tracheo-oesophageol fistula is a congenital abnormality involving an abnormal com-
munication between the windpipe and the gullet which prevents normal digestion of food,
CONCISE OXFORD MEDICAL DICTIONARY 239 (Corgi ed. 1982).
' The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-05 (1985)). [hereinafter
cited as Child Abuse Amendments of 1984]; The Department of Health and Human Services
Final Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. 14,878 (1985) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. Part 1340) [hereinafter
cited as the Child Abuse Rules].
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bedside of newborns.8 The new federal law and regulations arose in re-
sponse9 to the recent frequency and wide breadth of decisions to withhold
medically indicated treatment from handicapped newborns.' 0 Research
into physicians' attitudes towards handicapped infants shows that a ma-
jority believe that feasible life-sustaining treatment should be withheld in
See infra notes 100-129 and accompanying text.
9 As to the full reasons, see Legislative History, Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, P.L.
98-457, 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2918, 2925-27 (1985) [hereinafter cited as "Legislative
History."].
The frequency of decisions to selectively withhold treatment from handicapped or
malformed neonates has never been accurately discovered, probably because of the private
way in which such decisions are often made. Dr. Robert E. Cooke estimated that thousands of
decisions of this kind are taken each year in the United States. Medical Ethics: The Right to
Survival 1974: Hearing on the Examination of the Moral and Ethical Problems Faced with the
Agonizing Decision of Life and Death Before the Subcommittee on Health of the Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1974). It has also been reported that from
January 1, 1970 to June 30, 1972, 14% of the deaths in the intensive care nursery of the Yale
New Haven Hospital resulted from non-treatment decisions. Duff & Campbell, supra note 4.
Professor John Lorber has reported the widespread use of non-treatment for over a decade.
He has presented a breakdown of 848 infants born with a meningomyelocoele during 1958-
68. These infants were treated with the best methods available at the time of their birth and
50% were still alive in 1972, 81.4% of which were severely handicapped. Because of what
Professor Lorber considered a poor prognosis, he developed a set of criteria for non-
treatment, with selected patients receiving only normal nursing care and sedation from birth
onwards. Lorber, supra note 4; Lorber, Early Results of Selective Treatment of Myelomeningocele:
To Treat or Not to Treat, 53 PEDIATRICS 307 (1974).
For critical discussions of criteria for treatment selection see Black, Selective Treatment of
Infants with Myelomeningocele, 5 NEUROSURGERY 334 (1979); Reid, Spina Bifida: The Fate of the
Untreated-The Logical Outcome of Guidelines, 7 HAST. CEN. RPT. 16 (1977); Veatch, The Technical
Criteria Fallacy, 7 HAST. CEN. RPT. 15 (1977).
Individual instances of selective non-treatment of handicapped neonates have also been
reported in the medical literature and have sometimes been the subject of judicial decisions.
Freund, supra note 4 (Down's Syndrome with duodenal atresia); Gustafson, Mongolism, Par-
ental Desires and the Right to Lfe, 16 PERSPECT. BIOL. & MED. 529 (1973) (Johns Hopkin's
case-Down's Syndrome with duodenal atresia), Maine Medical Center v. Houle, No. 74-145
(Super. Ct. Cumberland Co., Me., Feb. 14, 1974) (multiple malformities, brain damage and
tracheo-oesophageal fistula); In re Obernauer Uuv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. Morris County, N.J., Dec.
22, 1970) (Down's syndrome with duodenal atresia); Infant Doe, supra note 5; In re Phillip B.,
92 Cal. App. 3,796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied sub nom. 445 U.S. 949 (1980). Three
cases of a similar kind have recently been reported in Europe. In re B. (A Minor) 1 WLR 1421
(1981) (Down's Syndrome with duodenal atresia); R. v. Arthur (Leicester Crown Ct., Nov. 5,
1981) (physician acquitted of attempted murder of Down's Syndrome infant born with
duodenal atresia where sedation was administered and no nourishment given); Dr. Willi
Appel and Dr. Eva Maria Klotz (Crim. Ct., Munich, Landesgericht 1. Schwargericht, ks 122 Js
4226/81, 24 March 1982) (physician convicted of second degree manslaughter and sentenced
to 2-1/2 years imprisonment for giving lethal injection to infant born with massively deformed
head and who was not expected to live). See Kaufman, Assessment of Euthanasia with Regard to
Babies under Ethics and Criminal Law, 14 JURESTENZEITUNG 481 (July 16, 1982). For further
discussions of frequency and visability of decisions not to treat see Ellis, supra note 4, at
398-401; Brown and Truitt, Euthanasia and the Right to Die, 3 OHio N.U.L. REV. 615, 634
(1976).
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certain circumstances." Studies indicate that social variables are the critical
determinants for physicians' non-treatment preferences.2
The Child Abuse Amendment and Regulations represent an ethical/
legal watershed. By examining the first critical moments in human devel-
opment, where decisions must be made to enable a handicapped neonate to
live or to allow it to die, this essay proposes a jurisprudefitial/ethical stan-
dard against which such decisions can be made. This standard is then
compared with the one set forth in the Child Abuse Amendment and
regulations.
II. MORAL ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE TREATMENT OF
HANDICAPPED NEONATES
Until relatively recently, society has eschewed explicit consideration of
the ethics of treatment selection resulting in the death of handicapped
infants. Selective non-treatment decisions, in practice, have devolved to the
parents because the circumstances are often thought to be too sensitive,
and the decision-making too complex, to be susceptible to any legal solution
or general ethical formula.1
3
No family which has experienced the emotions surrounding concep-
tion, gestation and birth can fail to have deep empathy with the parents of a
profoundly handicapped infant. 4 During the period directly following
11 D. CRANE, THE SANCTITY OF SOCIAL LIFE: PHYSICIANS' TREATMENT OF CRITICALLY ILL
PATIENTS 35-87 (1975) (among the most important influences in non-treatment decisions were
impact on family, potential usefulness to society or family and mother's attitudes). Todres,
Krane, Howell & Shannon, Pediatricians' Attitudes Affecting Decision-Making in Defective New-
borns, 60 PEDIATRICS 197 (1977) (46% felt Down's Syndrome infant with duodenal atresia
should be operated upon); McKilligan & Diller, Severe Congenital Abnormality in the Fetus
and Newborn: Physician Attitude to Management (1975) (paper presented at the Annual
Meeting of the Canadian Pediatric Association), reported in Affleck, Physicians' Attitudes Toward
Discretionary Medical Treatment of Down's Syndrome Infants, 18 MENTAL RETARDATION 79 (April
1980) (in an otherwise normal Down's infant, 17% would want parents to do "everything
humanly possible" to preserve life); Shaw, Randolph & Manard, Ethical Issues in Pediatric
Surgery: A National Survey of Pediatricians and Pediatric Surgeons, 60 PEDIATRICS 588 (1977) (one
third of sample would not "acquiesce" in parental decision not to surgically correct duodenal
atresia); Treating the Defective Newborn: A Survey of Physician's Attitudes, 6 HAST. CEN. RPT. 2
(Apr. 1976) (more than half sampled would not treat trisomy 18 newborns). See also Silverman,
The Child as a Social Object: Down's Syndrome Children in a Paedriatric Cardiology Clinic, 3
SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH AND ILLNESS 254 (1981) (excellent paper showing the ways in which
physicians treat children with Down's Syndrome differently from other children with heart
problems); Pilkington, Teaching Medical Students about Mental Handicap, 19 DEVEL. MED. CHILD
NEUROL. 652-58 (1977) (medical school teaching was not thought to facilitate appropriate
knowledge of mental retardation).
12 See generally, D. Crane, supra note 11.
13 See, e.g., Duff, Counselling Families and Deciding Care of Severely Defective Children: A Way
of Coping with 'Medical Vietnam,' 67 PEDIATRICS 315, 318 (1981); Williams, Down's Syndrome and
the Duty to Preserve Life, 131 NEW L.J. 1020 (1981).
"4 For discussions on the hardships parents face following the birth of a severely hand-
icapped neonate see R. DARLING, FAMILIES AGAINST SOCIETY: A STUDY OF REACTIONS TO
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birth, the family understandably desires privacy and wishes to avoid public
scrutiny. The parents' assessment of the family's well-being, while deserv-
ing of recognition, is not, however, dispositive. Every child enters society
with independent rights. Perceptions concerning the status and value of
those rights have substantially influenced legal and ethical thought on the
selective non-treatment of handicapped neonates. 5 The discussion below
examines three representative moral perspectives on the issue of selective
non-treatment decisions.
A. VITALISM
Vitalist thought represents a core value of society. 1 6 This philosophical
CHILDREN WITH BIRTH DEFECTS 45-79 (1979); Duff & Campbell, On Deciding the Care of Severely
Handicapped or Dying Persons: With Particular Reference to Infants, 57 PEDIATRICS 487, 488
(1976); Fletcher, Attitudes Toward Defective Newborns, 2 HAST. CEN. STUDS. 21 (1974); Kennell &
Klaus, Parental Reactions to the Birth of a Malformed Infant, 27 OXFORD MED. SCHOOL GAZETTE,
80 (1975); Shaw, Dilemmas of "Informed Consent" in Children, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 885, 886-87
(1973). For discussions of the effects on other children in the family see Bentovim, Emotional
Disturbances of Handicapped Pre-School Children and Their Families-Attitudes to the Child, 3 BRIT.
MED. J. 579 (1972); Cohen, The Impact of the Handicapped Child on the Family, 43 SOCIAL
CASEWORK 137 (1962); Gath, The Effect of a Malformed Child Upon Other Children, 27 OXFORD
MED. SCHOOL GAZETTE 81 (1975).
15 There are arguments, both moral and legal, that human life must attain characteristics
more complex and meaningful than simple existence before it should attract the attribute of
"personhood." See Kuhse, supra note 4; Singer, supra note 4. Fletcher's indicators of person-
hood include cortical functioning and minimal intelligence, a sense of time, concern for
others, and idiosyncracy. Fletcher, Indicators of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile of Man, 2 HAST.
CEN. RPT. 1 (Nov. 1972); Fletcher, Four Indicators of Humanhood-The Enquiry Matures, 4 HAST.
CEN. RPT. 4 (Dec. 1974). Nelson refers to socialness, capacity to experience limitation and
freedom, and religiousity or intentionality. J. NELSON, HUMAN MEDICINE 19-24 (1973). Tooley
focuses on self-consciousness, Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, in MORAL PROBLEMS IN MEDI-
CINE 297-317 (S. Gorovitz ed. 1976); Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS
37, 51 (1972).
The diversity in the factors which are presented as indicators of personhood suggests
caution. See Johnson, Selective Non-Treatment of Defective Newborns: An Ethical Analysis, 47
LINACRE QUART. 39, 45-47 (1980). For a jurisprudential view that a monster is not a human
being see G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW, 20-21, 31-35 (1957);
Williams, supra note 13 at 1021. For a medical view positing that where the prospects for "life"
are minimal, infants should not be treated as persons see Lachs, Humane Treatment and the
Treatment of Humans, 294 NEW ENG. J. MED. 838 (1976). This essay does not rely upon
"definitional perceptions" of humanhood because of the dangers inherent in removing the
concept of humanity from individuals or groups of individuals. Id. See also Ramsey, supra note
2, at 189-227; Bok, Ethical Problems of Abortion, 2 HAST. CEN. STUDS. 33, 41 (1974); Robertson,
supra note 4, at 246-51.
Definitional exemptions from personhood are sought to avoid an explicit breach of the
core societal value that intentional taking of life is never justified. Havighurst, Blumstein &
Bovberg, Strategies in Underwriting the Costs of Catastrophic Disease, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
122, 160 (1976). This removes the necessity of offering clear justifications for non-treatment
decisions relating to "non-persons." See, e.g., Fletcher & Bard, The Right to Die, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY 39, 64 (Apr. 1968) (a father should feel no guilt over the death of a Down's
Syndrome infant for guilt is only relevant to a person, and "a Down's is not a person.").
16 While the various ideas that life is sacrosant are often vague and misleading, see, e.g.,
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position holds that the preservation of individual human life is an end in
itself, irrespective of the social, economic, or personal cost. The vitalist
aggressively defends human biological existence. Life is so sacred to the
extreme vitalist that the effort to sustain it should include the use of
medical technology which is inordinately expensive, difficult to obtain, or
rarely successful (i.e., so-called "heroic" or "extraordinary" measures).' 7 A
more moderate vitalist position recognizes that decisions affecting individ-
ual human life are already made as a consequence of allocating scarce
health care resources. Consequently, there is no logical rationale for pro-
viding extraordinary treatment for handicapped neonates when the same
treatment would not customarily be used for patients with comparable
medical needs."' Under either position, all customary medical procedures
to prolong or save a life must be used irrespective of the patient's hand-
icaps.
The most defendable position of vitalists, therefore, is that life is the
value which everyone-handicapped or not-would regard as paramount.
Vitalist thought requires that medical treatment chosen for an otherwise
healthy person must also be chosen for one with physical and mental
handicaps, however severe. A particularly articulate statement of this
"medical efficacy" approach was made in 1983 by a coalition of medical
associations and advocacy organizations for disabled people:
Frankena, The Ethics of Respectfor Life, in RESPECT FOR LIFE IN MEDICINE, PHILOSOPHY, AND rHE
LAW 24 (S.F. BARKER ed. 1977), they are nonetheless deeply ingrained in Judeo-Christian
society. Roman Catholic Bishops' Conference for England and Wales, The Times (London)
Nov. 7, 1981, at 3, col. I (The right to life for all "innocent people" is totally independent of
the wishes of others or the judgment of society. There is no difference whether the person is
"in full vigour" or handicapped, whether their life is beginning or ending. But there is no
moral obligation to undertake "major and dangerous" treatment when it will only briefly
interrupt the onset of death); Moshe Tendler, a Professor of Talmudic Law, has stated that
"a person who has but a few minutes to live is no less of value than a person who has 60
years to live .. .a handicapped individual is a perfect specimen when viewed in an ethical
context. The value is an absolute value. It is not relative to life expectancy, to state or health or
to usefulness to society." H. BRODY, EIHICAL DECISIONS IN MEDICINE 75 (1981).
'1 There has been much discussion between "ordinary" and "extraordinary," between
"feasible" and "non-feasible," and between "conventional" and "unorthodox" medical treat-
ment. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1234-35; Honey, Acts and Omissions, 5
J. MED. E-riics 143 (1979); Robertson, supra note 4, at 235-37. Some have argued that these
traditional distinctions provide fruitful guidelines in determining the treatment of handi-
capped infants. Josen, Traditional Distinctions for Making Ethical judgments, 1984 ARIZ. STATE
L.J., 661 (1984); Comment, Baby Doe Decisions: Modern Society Sins of Omission, 63 NEB. L. REV.
888 (1984). Others cogently suggest that these distinctions are unclear in their application.
Capron, Borrowed Lessons: The Role of Ethical Distinctions in Framing Law on Life-Sustaining
Treatment, 1984 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 647 (1984). For the purpose of this essay, treatment decisions
for handicapped infants are measured against those for "normal" infants with similar medical
needs. A conventional or feasible treatment is one which, given the potential efficacy and risks,
would be administered to a non-handicapped infant.
11 See Havighurst, Blumstein & Bovberg, supra note 15, at 140-45.
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When medical care is clearly beneficial, it should always be pro-
vided .... Considerations such as anticipated or actual limited
potential of an individual and present or future lack of available
community resources are irrelevant .... The individual's medical
condition should be the sole focus of the decision .... In cases
where it is uncertain whether medical treatment will be beneficial,
a person's disability must not be the basis for a decision to with-
hold treatment.19
This approach has now found expression in the Child Abuse Amend-
ments and was cited with approval in the proposed regulations promul-
gated by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.2"
The considerable advantage of the vitalist position is its consistency of
values and application in individual cases. It is the only formula which
ensures complete equality in access to medical care to any person irrespec-
tive of handicap. Moreover, it is the only philosophic position which avoids
the essentially unresolvable human choice of which lives are worth living.
The treatment decision is based solely upon a medical judgment of the
patient's physical condition and the availability of treatment to remedy that
condition. While such decisions are often themselves subjective, they are
equally applicable to all patients.
A general ethical principle should not be accepted simply because it
can be applied consistently to individual cases. Vitalism represents the
easiest social choice precisely because it avoids the need for society to make
any choice among human lives. Choices, however, do have to be made
because there are circumstances where individuals may reasonably prefer
death to a life rendered unendurable by totally incapacitating illness or
disability.21 This is true regardless of the chronological age of the patient.22
B. SOCIAL UTILITARIANISM
The other end of the philosophical spectrum is social utilitarianism. 23
Proponents of the doctrine would balance the potential productivity of the
life to be preserved with the social and economic costs of the treatment.
1' AMERICAN ACADEMY O PEDIATrRICS,JOINT POLICY SIATEMENT PRINCIPLES OF TREATMENT
OF DISABLED INFANTS, 73 PEDIATRICS 559, 561 (1984).
2" Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program: Notice of Proposed
Rule Making, 49 Fed. Reg. 48161, 48161-62 (1984) [hereinafter cited as "Child Abuse
Proposed Rules"].
21 The courts have already recognized that in certain circumstances, a decision may be
made on behalf of an incompetent adult to withhold life-sustaining treatment. See infra notes
66-70 and accompanying text.
22 As to the case law regarding the medical treatment of children in the absence of
parental consent, see infra notes 49-77 and accompanying text.
23 For a comprehensive assessment of utilitarianism in the context of treatment decisions
for the newborn see Robertson, supra note 4, at 252-62.
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Thus, not only would the limited social and economic potential of a se-
verely handicapped infant weigh against treatment, but also the inordinate
cost of the treatment and long term domestic or institutional care would be
relevant. Social utilitarianism, therefore, would result in treatment for a
specific physical condition being withheld from a severely handicapped
infant, even if the same treatment would be given to an otherwise healthy
infant. The critical factors in the treatment decision are not the efficacy of
the treatment or the remediability of the physical condition, but the social
and economic cost to others resulting from treatment and lifelong care.
If applied to all age groups, social utilitarianism would imperil the
lives of many ill-functioning people who are regarded as economically and
socially non-productive. Since each of us may reach a point in our lives
when our "usefulness" to society could be questioned, self-interest alone
should bar wide-spread acceptance of social utilitarianism. Utilitarian ideals
would also be unacceptable to people who believe that human life should
not be measured by its utility to others but by its intrinsic value for the
individual.
Under utilitarian thought, the decision to terminate life does not
include consideration of the choice the patient would make if competent. If
we accept that virtually no competent person would make his or her social
value, as perceived by others, the major determinant in deciding whether
or not to seek medical care, it is difficult to accept the logic of applying a
standard based upon cost and social worth in relation to any human life.
C. QUALITY OF LIFE
The term "quality of life" has been introduced into Anglo-American
jurisprudence 4 and by commentators2 5 to justify the withholding of medi-
24 Courts have been reluctant expressly to adopt a "quality of life" criterion and have been
careful not to demarcate a class of individuals, such as the mentally retarded or senile, as
deserving a lower standard of legal protection. Yet several courts have made implicit assess-
ments of personal quality of life and normalcy in coming to their decisions. It is helpful to
distinguish between two groupings of cases to determine whether a court is actually employing
a "quality of life" standard. The first are cases which are decided principally by an assessment
of the medical benefits, risks and adverse effects of the treatment in question. (Is there a
"substantial chance for cure?" Are there "medically effective alternative treatments?") Here,
the court's decision follows directly from the medical assessment. The principal finding is
factual, i.e., whether a medical consensus exists that the treatment is indicated and that there
are no medically recognized alternatives. Given this finding of fact courts will usually come to
the same decision, irrespective of the legal standard applied. See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 375
Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978), aff'd, 378 Mass. 732, 393 N.E.2d 836 (1979) (order
permitting chemotherapy for minor patient suffering from acute lymphocytic leukemia over
parental objection; court found chemotherapy offered a "substantial chance for cure" and the
alternative treatment of metabolic therapy was medically ineffective and poisonous); In re
Hofbauer, 65 A.D.2d 108, 411 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 1009,
419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979) (a child suffering from Hodgkins Disease whose parents failed to
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cally indicated treatment for severely handicapped infants whose life would
be so bereft of enjoyment as not to be worth living. As under social
utilitarian thought, medically effective treatment, even if available and
efficacious for an otherwise normal infant, could be withheld based upon
broader consideration of the infant's handicaps. The relevant factors
under a "quality of life" assessment relate not to social worth or to economic
cost, but to the infant's potential for human contentment.
It is difficult to argue with the premise underlying the "quality of life"
position, for there must come a point for most of us where life is so devoid
of meaning and contentment that it is not worth living. As a philosophic
position, its weakness is that the factors which would justify forsaking
follow attending physician's recommendation for treatment by radiation and chemotherapy,
but rather placed child under care of licensed physician advocating nutritional or metabolic
therapy, was not a neglected child; court found parents had justifiable concerns about
deleterious effects of radiation and chemotherapy, that alternative treatments were control-
ling child's condition, and that conventional treatments would be administered if child's
condition so warranted); Ex rel Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup. Ct. 1979)
(guardian appointed to consent to corrective surgery for infant born with meningomyelocele.
The court found child unlikely to live beyond 24 months without surgery and that surgery
would permit child to walk with leg braces and to have "normal intellectual development" with
little future risk of mental retardation.).
The cases cited above should be distinguished from those where the court is influenced
not only by its findings of fact as to the choices of treatment, but also by the person's wider
characteristics, including his or her potential for intellectual and social functioning. See, e.g., In
re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied sub. nom, 445 U.S. 949
(1980) (court declined to order life-prolonging heart surgery for minor suffering from
congenital ventricular septal heart defect. The trial court found corrective surgery to be
medically indicated with 5 to 10 per cent mortality rate but noted that the child had Down's
Syndrome; the judge commented that he personally could not handle it "if it happened to
me."); Infant Doe, supra note 5 (court order barring doctors from providing nourishment or
treatment for Downs Syndrome infant born with a deformity in the stomach wall which
prevented food being digested; the condition could have been corrected by surgery which was
serious but considered within the range of standard medical practice); In re Spring, 380 Mass.
629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980) (court approval for removal of 78 year old patient from kidney
dialysis, probate court found patient to be senile and incapable of restoration to a "normal,
cognitive, integrated functioning existence"); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (authorization for non-treatment of 67 year
old mentally retarded ward suffering from acute myeloblastic monocytic leukemia; probate
court found chemotherapy was life-prolonging and was treatment of choice, but patient's
profound retardation was a significant issue in the case); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d
1209 (1985) (nursing home resident with severe and permanent mental and physical defects
and limited life expectancy could have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn in certain circum-
stances).
If one were to remove the wider "quality of life" element from the facts of these cases the
results would appear anomalous and, in some instances, clearly erroneous. It is highly
probable that the court in each of these cases would have opted to prolong a life it considered
worth living. See Annas, Quality of Life in the Courts: Early Spring in Fantasyland, 10 HAST. CEN.
RPT. 9 (Aug. 1980). A further, albeit less apparent, instance of a quality of life assessment
occurred in in re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) and its
progeny. See infra note 66. See also, Annas, Reconciling Quinlan and Saikewicz: Decision-Making
for the Terminally Ill Incompetent, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 367 (1979).
2. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 4, at 651-61; Williams, supra note 13, at 1020-21.
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continued life are seldom, if ever, specified. If one accepts that continued
life is not in the infant's interest, then those who make this decision must be
clear about the criteria to be adopted. Yet the basis for identifying and
measuring those interests under a "quality of life" standard is unclear.
In practice, the term "quality of life" often is not used as a coherent
moral theory which defines with any certainty which handicapping condi-
tions should or should not be treated. Rather, the term is employed as a
signal by those who believe that selective non-treatment decisions are too
delicate and complex to be governed by any coherent legal or ethical
standard. Accordingly, most of those who advocate a "quality of life"
assessment seek to maintain the decision-making process within a confiden-
tial doctor/patient framework.
D. PROPOSED MORAL STANDARD BASED UPON PERSONAL INTERESTS
Decisions which intimately affect human life require resolution within'
a framework of public morality which finds its expression and sanction in
the law. The class of neonates subject to selective non-treatment decisions
must be carefully and narrowly defined. It is important to distinguish,
insofar as possible, those grave and exceptional cases where the neonate
irremediably lacks the capacity to live a recognizable human life from those
situations where the judgment is actually based upon comparative social
worth. Furthermore, there should be some discernible moral consensus for
the substitute decision to be made, i.e., there should be a reasonable
certainty that a competent individual would not choose to continue life in
the circumstances presented. The intention here is to propose criteria
which recognize the personal interests of the ward in continuing life,
without basing his or her comparative social and economic worth upon a
measure of "normalcy."
The following categories cover the entire set of circumstances where
selective non-treatment decisions may legitimately be made. Where the
specific and narrowly conceived criteria are met there is a choice to be made
whether to treat the infant. No such choice would arise in any other
context. In cases which do not come within the narrow criteria proposed,
the same "medical feasibility" standard used for all patients would apply,
i.e., treatment would depend upon a purely medical judgment as to the
efficacy of the proposed treatment, its alternatives, and risks. Outside the
narrow criteria proposed, the responsibility of the guardian of any child,
whether handicapped or not, to provide medical treatment grows stronger
as the treatment of choice becomes clearer and, more importantly, the risk
to the child of not having treatment becomes greater.
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1. The Neonate is not Conscious and Sapient
Judicial principles governing treatment for the incompetent patient
have been derived from positions of extremity. The standard in Quinlan"6
and its progeny 7 for non-treatment decisions which do not require judicial
approval should apply to any incompetent patient, irrespective of the stage
in chronological human development.28 Thus, where an infant is perma-
nently comatose and has no reasonable possibility of returning to a cogni-
tive, sapient state, aggressive medical treatment would not be required.
Moreover, since the decision is exclusively dependent upon a reliable
prognosis, it should lie with the guardian and medical professionals.
Confirmation of the prognosis by other physicians through a hospital
review board or by concurring medical opinions would be a reasonable
prerequisite to the decision-making process.
Adoption of a Quinlan standard would quell some of the concerns of
the medical profession by allowing the physician, in conjunction with the
guardian, to make decisions in exceptional cases without recourse to prior
judicial approval. Most appropriately, this standard could be followed in
cases where the infant is inflicted with abnormalities incompatible with
sapience, i.e., where the abnormality, disease or damage to the central
nervous system, especially the brain, is so gross as to make the attainment of
a cognitive sapient state improbable. A reliable prognosis meeting a Quinlan
standard could be made and confirmed in infants presenting with such
conditions as anencephaly,2 9 hydranencephaly ll and extreme forms of
2 6 1n re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 657, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
27 See infra note 66.
25 It has been suggested that the Quinlan criteria would not apply in the case of severely
defective newborns because the infant's quality of life seems more hopeful. Ellis, supra note 4,
at 405-07. It is difficult to see what hope the life of a permanently comatose infant possibly
promises to offer. Courts could not reasonably apply special protective standards for the
newborn who has no reasonable potential for attaining a cognitive sapient existence. In one
case, for example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ordered that no extraordinary resuscita-
tive measures should be taken in the case of a conscious and cognitive infant who did not have
a life expectancy beyond one year. Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982).
2, Anencephaly is a partial or total absence of the brain. See Hamilton, Hutchison, Fraser,
Kooh & Farquhar, Disorders of the Endocrine Glands, in TEXTBOOK OF PAEDIATRICS 1128-29 (J.
Forfar & G. Arneil 3d ed. 1984). One distinguished pediatrician refers to anencephaly as "a
lethal malfunction in which the vault of the skull is absent and the exposed brain is amorph-
ous. Between 75 and 80 percent of these infants are stillborn and the remainder succumb
within hours or a few days after birth." Bell, Abnormalities in Size and Shape of the Head, in
DISEASES OF THE NEWBORN 716-17 (A. Schaffer & M. Avery 4th ed. 1977).
30 In hydranencephaly the bulk of the cerebral cortex is replaced by fluid. See Brown,
Stark, Minns, Aicardi, Shaw, Steer, Townsend, Macdonald, Forfar and Fulford, Disorders of
the Central Nervous System, in TEXTBOOK OF PAEDIATRICS 704 U. Forfar & G. Arneil 3d ed. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as Disorders of the CNS]; Bell supra note 29, at 733-35; L. HOLMES, H. MOSER,
S. HALDORSSON, C. MACK, S. PLANT, & B. MATZILEVICH, MENTAL RETARDATION: AN ATLAS OF
DISEASES WITH ASSOCIATED ABNORMAL:TIES, 204 (1972) [hereinafter cited as MENTAL
RETARDATION].
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hydrocephalus. 3 1 In such cases, withholding treatment would be legally
and ethically acceptable. 2
2. The Potential for Dealing with, and Responding to, Sensory
Information and Experiencing Thought is de minimis
Quinlan and its progeny involved patients who were in chronic and
irreversible vegetative states. Arguably, the Quinlan standard is too narrow
to include many neonates who are grievously afflicted by multiple physical
and mental handicaps. It may be desirable to extend the Quinlan standard
to cover the neonate who is conscious and sapient, but whose potential for
responding appropriately to sensory information or experiencing thought
is de minimis, i.e., those infants whose response to their environment is
primitive and broadly reflexive. Infants who may come within this category
include those born with a progressive, degenerative disease of the brain
such as infantile leucodystrophy,3 3 with certain severe chromosome disor-
ders such as Trisomy 13, 34 with gross and imminently life threatening
abnormalities such as the total absence of kidneys,35 and with fully
documented severe brain damage following asphyxia, hemorrhage, or
infection.3 6 Most infants with afflictions such as these have massive physical
31 The term hydrocephalus encompasses a group of conditions associated with ventricular
enlargement. Hydrocephalus implies the presence of an increased quantity of cerebrospinal
fluid under increased pressure. Abnormal enlargement of the head often occurs when
hydrocephalus begins prenatally (as with babies born with myelomeningocele) or in the
newborn period. Newborns with very extreme forms of hydrocephalus, especially if compli-
cated by other abnormalities or by CNS infection may not have the potential to lead a
conscious sapient existence. See Bell, supra note 29, at 725-33; Disorders of the CNS, supra note
30, at 700-04.
32 There are cases where the medical response at birth often is not to take special
resuscitation measures. More difficult issues arise after extrauterine life has been established
but where there may be little potential for a fully cognitive sapient existence.
" Leucodystrophies and leucoencephalopathies are disorders of myelination in a devel-
oping young brain. In Krabbe's Leucodystrophy, for example, at about three months babies
become fretful, vomit and lose weight. There is optic atrophy and eventual blindness. Fits and
spasms occur, accompanied by the inability to swallow, and finally a generalized flaccid
paralysis. Death occurs within two years and frequently before one year of age. See Disorders of
the CNS, supra note 30, at 781-82; MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 30, at 18.
"4 Trisomy 13 is a chromosome defect. The baby is low birth weight, microcephalic, and
commonly has abnormalities of the ears, eyes, limbs and heart. All are severely mentally
retarded, with marked hypertonia and myoclonic spasms. Half of these infants live beyond
one month, more than half the remainder die before three months, and only five per cent
survive beyond three years. See Bell, supra note 29, at 917-18; Bain & Ellis, Chromosomal
Disorders in TEXTBOOK OF PAEDIATRICS 912-13 (J. Forfar & G. Arneil 3d ed. 1984); MENTAL
RETARDATION, supra note 30, at 164.
" Such an infant would rapidly die without dialysis or kidney transplant, neither of which
are done for neonates. While the brain may be normal, the metabolic abnormalities would
soon produce coma and death.
36 Infants, for various reasons, may suffer from hemorrage, asphyxia, or infection at
birth, generally resulting in grievous life long injuries. See Bell, Perinatal Insults to the Brain and
Spinal Cord in DISEASES OF THE NEWBORN 703-15 (A. Schaffer & M. Avery 4th ed. 1977).
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malformations and will subsist at the most rudimentary level of conscious-
ness for their entire lives. Qualitatively, it is difficult to differentiate such
infants' existence from those who are comatose. The plight of infants in the
former category may indeed be worse; because they have some rudimen-
tary consciousness, they may also experience pain and discomfort. There
can be no legal or ethical justification for preserving such lives through
intervention where no prospect of minimal human functioning exists. It is
essential that the prognosis be certain; therefore, when difficult cases arise
in the determination of a "severely impaired response potential,""7 addi-
tional professional guidance should be sought. 8
3. The Neonate is Terminally III and in the Process of Dying
Difficulties arise in extending the preceding two standards to cases
where it is less obvious that a newborn or other incompetent person should
be allowed to die. The literature shows that selective non-treatment deci-
sions in pediatric practice extend well beyond the circumstances envisaged
under the two standards described above.3 " The two standards, which are
exceedingly narrow in scope, are essentially concerned with infants who
could have no response, or only the most primitive reflexive response, to
stimulation; these children lie virtually motionless in their beds, essentially
unaware of the world around them.
The question arises whether there is ever ajustification for not treating
handicapped infants who have a potential to minimally engage their physi-
cal environments, for example, by sitting up, turning the head to follow a
light, reacting to sounds, or purposefully grasping an object. Children with
some or all of these abilities will not fall within either of the two standards
37 For a discussion of persistent states of minimum cognition in incompetent adult
patients, see Jennett & PHuM, Persistent Vegetative State After Brain Damage: A Syndrome in Search
of a Name, I LANCE'T 734 (1972).
11 It is often difficult to detect, only hours or days following birth, what the neonate
(particularly if severely defective) is experiencing of the outside world or what he is likely to
experience in the future. It'seems imperative for the medical profession to arrive at a code to
guide attending pediatricians' prognoses under these circumstances. Certain forms of objec-
tive evidence should be required before an infant may be declared to have severely impaired
response potential. For example, the code might refer to the absence of active response to food,
noise, sight, rocking and cuddling or other human stimulation; the prognosis, however, would
have to refer to maximum future potential, as opposed to existing capabilities.
The use of statutory orjudicial standards in conjunction with medical guidelines has an
analogy with brain death. See generally Lovato v. Distict Court, 198 Colo. 419, 601 P.2d 1072,
1076 n. 6 (1979); Sch neck, Brain Death and Prolonged States of Impaired Responsiveness, 58 DEN. L.
J. 609, 618-25 (1981). A similar code of guidance is needed to assist in the reliable identifica-
tion of severely impaired response potential in neonates. For a discussion of the state of
consciousness of a newborn and his predictable directed responsiveness when in a social
interaction with a nurttring adult or when receiving attractive auditory, tactile or visual
stimuli, see Brazel ton, Neonatal Behavior and its Significance in DISEASES OF riE NEWBORN, 37-56
(A. Schaffer & M. Avery 4th ed. 1977).
a" See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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discussed above. It is suggested, however, that in some circumstances
medically indicated treatment would not serve the interests of an infant
who is terminally ill and in the process of dying. This does not mean that
death be imminent in days or weeks, but it must be unavoidable within
months or several years at most. To reach such a decision it must be
demonstrably clear that the pain and suffering associated with proposed
life-sustaining treatment would be wholly disproportionate to the infant's
potential for achieving any personal satisfaction or human interaction.
This category differs from the previous two in that its parameters are
less amenable to precise delineation. If an infant has the potential to
minimally engage in his or her world, there is no single characteristic which
would clearly indicate that feasible treatment should be withheld. Never-
theless, the absence of any single dispositive factor does not, and should
not, mean that courts can avoid their traditional responsibility for deter-
mining where the interests of the ward lie; those interests may require
non-treatment in circumstances where it is reasonably likely that a compe-
tent person would make the same choice.
The benchmark for this category is a clear prognosis of death within
months or several years at most.4 0 While terminal illness is the primary
justification for the non-treatment of infants falling within this category, it
is not a sufficient justification in itself. There are a cluster of additional
characteristics which are relevant:
a. severe or progressively increasing pain and suffering;
b. severely impaired cognitive and learning potential which pre-
cludes social or human interaction;
c. multiple physical disabilities preventing any significant volun-
tary movement; and
d. multiple severe impairments or absence of sense perception,
particularly sight and hearing.
A balancing process, made on a case by case basis, would determine
whether an infant falls within this non-treatment category. Each element is
an important part of the balance and objective medical evidence on each
factor should be sought. Clear medical evidence indicating that the infant is
afflicted with most or all of the cluster items would warrant a non-
treatment decision; inconclusive or contrary medical evidence would
favor administration of feasible treatment. The presence or absence of any
40 A feature of the case law relating to selective non-treatment decisions is the very short
life expectancy of the incompetent patient, together with the minimal potential for learning
and development. See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982); In re
Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). Severely limited life expectancy is taken to
mean that the neonate would not be expected to live beyond infancy, usually under 24
months.
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one of the cluster items would not be conclusive. Infants who might fall
within this category for non-treatment include those born with such
chronic progressive disorders as Tay Sacks disease,
41 Menkes Syndrome, 42
and severe chromosomal disorders such as Trisomy 18.
4
1
One of the touchstones of the balancing process is the potential for
human satisfaction from social or interpersonal interaction. It is assumed
that the potential for such satisfaction weighs heavily on the scale of human
endeavor. The potential for developing communication skills and other
complex patterns of behavior would be indicators favoring efficacious
treatment. For example, it could not be said with confidence that efficaci-
ous treatment should be withheld from an infant with a non-correctable
heart condition who will have normal cognitive and emotional develop-
ment for some two or three years. Such a child will experience many
valuable aspects of life; the uncertainty of any prediction that the child's life
would be intolerable is too great to justify non-treatment.
This standard for non-treatment, then, would not apply to infants
born with conditions such as Down's Syndrome44 or spina bifida, 45 without
41 In this condition there is a storage of ganglioside GM on the brain and in the viscera. As
a result, the brain may be very large (megalencephaly) but if the infant lives longer than 18
months, secondary degeneration in white matter, and extensive cell loss, may result in cerebral
atrophy and a small brain. The disease occurs primarily in Ashkenazi Jews. The clinical
picture is described infra in the text accompanying notes 60-61. See also Disorders of the CNS,
supra note 30, at 775; BIRTH DEFECTS COMPENDIUM 486-87 (D. Bergsma ed. 1979); MENTAL
RETARDATION, supra note 30, at 62. A similar disease is infantile GM1 Gangliosidoses where
there is a generalized storage of GM1 ganglioside. The end result is blindness, deafness and
decerebrate rigidity with death from 2 months to 3 years. See Disorders of the CNS, supra note
30, at 775-76; MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 30, at 22.
42 Menkes Syndrome, also known as steely-hair or kinky hair disease, is inherited in an
X-linked recessive fashion. Within a few weeks drowsiness, lethargy, hypotonia, and feeding
difficulties appear; hypothermia is common, as are progressive developmental retardation,
spasticity, seizures, variable muscle tone and immobility. The infant develops a decerebrate
posture and appears unaware of his surroundings. Death usually occurs in the first or second
year. Buist, Kennaway, Kelly, Lloyd, Fernandes, Hume & Forfar, Metabolic Disorders, in
TEXTBOOK OF PAEDIATRICS 1235-36 (J. Forfar & G. Arneil 3d ed. 1984); MENTAL RE-
TARI)ATION, supra note 30, at 100; BIRTH DEFECTS COMPENDIUM, 694-95 (D. Bergsma ed.
1979).
43 Apart from Trisomy 21 (Down's Syndrome), trisomy of chromosome 18, also called
Edward's Syndrome is probably the most commonly encountered autosomal trisomy. Many
affected babies are of low birthweight, with a small elongated head and a flattening of the
forehead down to the nose. Cardiac and renal anomalies are invariably present. Thirty
percent die by I month, 50 percent by 2 months, 70 percent by 3 months, 90 percent by 1 year
and 99 percent before age 10. Survivors are profoundly retarded in motor and intellectual
development. None have been able to walk or talk. Bain & Ellis, Chromosomal Disorders in
TEXTBOOK OF PAEDIATRICS 910-12 (J. Forfar & G. Arneil 3d ed. 1984); MENTAL RETARDATION,
supra note 30, at 160; BIRTH DEFECTS COMPENDIUM 201-202 (D. Bergsma ed. 1979).
44 Down's Syndrome is a chromosomal defect which usually results in mental retardation.
Because there are three number 21 chromosomes instead of the usual two, this condition has
been given the medical classification of Trisomy 21. See generally Craft, Chromosomal Abnor-
malities, in Tredgold's MENTAL RETARDATION 52-54 (M. Craft 12th ed. 1979). The cumulative
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any accompanying irremediable condition falling within one of the narrow
standards previously proposed. Any neonate who, with treatment, can
expect to live and progress through infancy into childhood, 46 and who is
capable of human feeling and social response, should be sustained by
efficacious medical treatment. It is the responsibility of the state as parens
results of scientific, psychological and educational research in the last decade have demon-
strated that the potential of infants born with a recognized primary syndrome or condition
such as Down's Syndrome has been seriously underestimated. With systematic training,
education, and stimulation during the early years of development, the majority of Down's
Syndrome children without any accompanying irremediable disability can expect to develop
basic social and motor skills, including language, mobility, and, often, literacy. These children
possess the potential for social interaction, family integration and the formation of peer
relationships. The increased knowledge of early development and a heightened awareness of
the importance of education and normal emotional interchange has considerably altered the
conception of a Down's Syndrome child from that of a passive and unresponsive recipient of
information to a person capable of active learning and progressive human development.
Down's Syndrome children are as diverse in their desire and ability to participate in social
activity and in the enjoyment of life as other children. See Rynders, Spiker & Horobin,
Underestimating the Educability of Down's Syndrome Children: Examination of Methodology Problems in
Recent Literature, 82 AM. J, MENT. DEF. 440 (1978); Clarke & Clarke, Mental Retardation and
Behavioral Change, 30 BRaIT. MED. BULL. 179 (1974); Drash, Increasing Intelligence and Speech in
Down's Syndrome Infants: A Three to Five Year Follow-up, 5 DOWN'S SYNDROME: PAPERS AND
ABSTRACTS FOR PROFESSIONALS 2 (1982); See Cunningham, Early Stimulation of the Severely
Handicapped Child in TREDGOLD'S MENTAL RETARDATION 82 (M. Craft 12th ed. 1979); Kirman,
Growing up with Down's Syndrome, BRIT. J. Hosp. MED. 385 (April 1980); Cooke, Heron,
Heward & Test, Integrating a Down's Syndrome Child in a Classroom Peer Tutoring System: A Case
Report, 20 MENTAL RETARDATION 22 (1982); Sinson & Wetherwick, The Behavior of Children with
Down's Syndrome in Normal Playgroups, 25J. MENT. DEF. 113 (1981); Harris,Physical Therapy and
Infants with Down's Syndrome: The Effects of Early Intervention, 42 REHABILITATION LITERATURE
339 (1981). For a review of the literature on the capacity for growth and development of
Down's Syndrome children and adults see S. PUESCHEL & L. STEINBERG, DOWN SYNDROME: A
COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY 349-59 (1980).
45 Spina bifida is a developmental defect in which the newborn baby has part of the spinal
cord and its coverings exposed through a gap in the backbone. The symptoms may include
paralysis of the legs, incontinence, and mental retardation from the commonly associated
brain defect, hydrocephalus. Spina bifida is associated with abnormally high levels of al-
phafetoprotein in the amniotic fluid surrounding the embryo. The condition can be diag-
nosed at about the 16th week of pregnancy by a test on the amniotic fluid (amniocentesis). See
Disorders of the CNS, supra note 30; Sylvester & Craft, Acquired Conditions, in TREDGOLD'S
MENTAL RETARDATION 115, 118-19 (M. Craft 12th ed. 1979); Ellis, supra note 4, at 395-96.
Professor Lorber reports that of the first 41 spina bifida infants selected for non-treatment
(food, water and nursing care only) none survived beyond eight months and 60% were dead
before they reached one month of age. Lorber, supra note 4, at 55. Elsewhere he reports that
of his selective non-treatment cases, 80% die within three months and only four percent are
still alive before one year. Lorber, The Management of Spina Bifida, 27 OXFORD MEDICAL
SCHOOL GAZETTE 76 (1975).
46 One of the most difficult cases is illustrated by Pelizaeus-Merzbacher disease which is a
more chronically slow progressive disorder. The speech is at best limited to a few words;
usually only grunting sounds are made. By three to six years of age many patients are
immobile with scissoring of their legs and flexed arms. Optic pallor and loss of vision develops
late in the course of the disease. Dementia, a masklike facial expression, and seizures usually
occur. Terminally, the patients have difficulty in swallowing, vomit frequently, and are incon-
tinent. MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 30, at 75.
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patriae to enrich the life of such a child by providing the treatment, care,
and habilitation necessary to maximize the child's development. This usu-
ally requires the placement of.the infant in normal surroundings that
provide full opportunities for love, education and general stimulation.
This should be the area of common agreement at the intersection of
law, medicine, and ethics: a handicapped infant who has the potential for
human satisfaction within his or her own limited orbit of existence has the
right to the nurturing and medical care necessary to achieve that potential
and to develop to maturity.
E. PRIOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE PROPOSED STANDARDS
A question of substantial importance to the health care community, as
well as to parents, is whether the courts will require prior judicial review of
any decision to withhold efficacious treatment. Courts have adopted vary-
ing procedures for exercising an incompetent person's right to refuse
medical treatment. 47 While a full resolution of this question is beyond the
scope of this essay, some general guidelines in relation to the criteria
proposed above are offered.
Where there are societal, as opposed to purely clinical, issues to be
determined, it is for the courts to lay down general principles to be applied
by the health care profession. The question of whether a treatment is
indicated is a matter for the medical profession; whether a medically
indicated treatment is to be withheld is a social/ethical matter for resolution
in the courts. Our common law system operates on the basis of general
rules laid down by a court to be followed without the need for judicial
approval in every case. Parents and health care professionals can be relied
upon to follow a common set of rules laid down in advance by the courts.
Courts should strive to develop clear and objective principles which
command a wide social consensus. If clear principles can be formulated,
the practical implementation can effectively be left to the medical profes-
sion. Already such forms of social consensus and objective criteria are
present in policies concerning brain death and the treatment of irreversibly
comatose patients. Here most courts have developed procedures for non-
treatment decisions which do not require their participation. 48
It is suggested that the first two categories proposed in this essay are
instances where non-treatment decisions could be made without prior
review by a court. Objective signs designate those infants who are "irrever-
sibly comatose" or suffer from a "severely impaired response potential."
There exists, moreover, an increasing social consensus that a passive, non-
47 See infra note 68.
" See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
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responsive, non-interactive life is not worth living. Accordingly, if there is
agreement between the parents and the health care personnel, it is difficult
to see any need for judicial approval prior to making the decision to
withhold treatment. Both categories would require reasonably certain
prognoses corraborated, for example, by a hospital medical committee.
By clearly enunciating the circumstances where prior judicial approval
for non-treatment decisions is not required, courts would promote family
privacy and avoid public scrutiny of intimate personal decisions, give clear
notice to parents and professionals of their legal obligations to treat hand-
icapped neonates, and minimize the time and resources expended in litigat-
ing these issues.
Judicial review prior to a selective non-treatment decision is warranted
only in two circumstances:
1) where there is a conflict of evidence or views which requires independent
resolution, e.g., where there is no clear medical consensus as to the prog-
nosis or there is disagreement between the patient or the patient's guardian
and health care personnel on the appropriateness of treatment;
2) where there is a conflict over the application of accepted legal principles.
Where the facts fit clearly within objective criteria previously laid down by a
court, prior judicial review is not warranted. The courts are only beginning
to develop the broad concept of "best interests" into natrow standards
which can be objectively applied to diverse factual situations. Therefore,
the ideal scenario in which the facts can be fully squared with judicial
precedent will not soon occur in relation to many situations of death and
dying. Were the courts to adopt the cluster of factors proposed here, they
would still be expected to insist upon prior review, except in cases fulfilling
most or all of the cluster criteria.
III. JURISPRUDENCE RELATING TO SELECTIVE
NON-TREATMENT DECISIONS
A. THE TRADITIONAL "BEST INTERESTS" PRINCIPLE
If the parents wish that their handicapped child should be helped to
live, there is no greater legal or moral imperative which should override
that decision. It is, however, also within the parents' discretion to decide
that they do not wish to rear a handicapped child. The extent of parental
autonomy regarding an unwanted offspring thus raises difficult questions.
Such a decision traditionally results in state intervention. Child welfare
agencies generally prefer to seek adoptive or foster care in the community,
thus placing the interests of the handicapped infant on the same level as
those of the "normal" infant. However, if the parents do not want the child,
under what circumstances do they have the legal prerogative to decide that
it shall not live?
50 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 11 NO. 1
A perennial source of discourse in family law concerns the point at
which an exercise of parental choice is so harmful to the child as to require
state intervention.49 The common law view of the parental function was
based upon duties owed to parents by their children; parents had natural
rights over the child which were considered to be in the nature of a
property interest.5 0 This position maximized parental choice and some-
times verged upon permitting unfettered parental autonomy. The law still
favors those parental choices which promote family integration, privacy,
and the child's need for continuity of relationships. Conforming to these
values, Anglo-American jurisprudence espouses the principle of minimum
public intervention.
The law, then, allows parents a considerable "margin of appreciation"
to rear and nurture their children. The law vests in parents reciprocal
rights and responsibilities to raise their children to maturity and to make
reasonable misjudgments along the way. There is no jurisprudential prin-
ciple requiring parents to maximize a child's developmental potential or
happiness, or to prevent any insignificant harm from coming to the child.
While no unequivocal judicial boundaries have been set to determine the
precise extent of parental autonomy, the modern view does not extend
parental authority without limit. Parents have no legal right to make deci-
sions which cause serious irreversible harm to their children; there is no
judicial principle or statutory provision making handicapped children an
exception.
Courts have accepted the need for public intervention where parental
decisions about medical care threaten significant potential harm to the
child.51 The State's decision to intervene depends principally upon the
19 Compare Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental
Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645 (1977) (strong presumption in favor of parental autonomy) with
Dickens, The Modern Function and Limits of Parental Rights, 97 L.Q.R. 462 (1981) (parental
function is limited to protection of children against physical, psychological, social and moral
harm). See also Horwitz, Of Love and Laetrile: Medical Decision-Making in a Child's Best Interests, 5
Am. J.L. & MED. 271 (1979); Note, Judicial Limitations on Parental Autonomy in the Medical
Treatment of Minors, 59 NEB. L. REv. 1093 (1980).
50 See Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1975). The concept of "child as chattel"
is a frequently overstated common law principle. Even at common law it was a misdemeanor
"to neglect to supply necessaries to a child, being of tender years and unable to provide for
itself, and whom the defendant was bound either by duty or contract to support." R. v. Friend,
168 Eng. Rep. 662 (1802). However, it was not sufficient to support an indictment for neglect,
abandonment, or exposure to prove "that the children did suffer in some degree ... but not to
any serious extent." R. v. Phillpot, 169 Eng. Rep. 686, 687 (1853). The common law estab-
lished boundaries to parental decision-making. Clearly outside of the scope of parental choice
are decisions which adversely affect the child's opportunity to live. Blackstone commented on
the obligations of parents at common law: "By begetting them ... they have entered into a
voluntary obligation to endeavor, as far as in them lies, that the life which they have bestowed
shall be supported and preserved." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 447.
11 See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 374 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978), aff'd 378 Mass.
732, 393 N.E.2d 836 (1979); In re Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup. Ct. 1979);
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potential efficacy of the proposed medical treatment, whether there are
effective alternative treatments, and the extent of avoidable risk to the
child. In particular, a parent's decision to withhold authorization for an
established treatment to correct a life threatening medical condition appears
to be well outside of the parental "margin of appreciation. 52 It is now well
settled that parents are under a duty to prevent avoidable and premature
termination of life. Any decision which significantly impedes a child's
natural development toward full maturity is outside the established bound-
aries of parental choice and autonomy.13
B. PARENTAL DECISIONS WHICH CAUSE SIGNIFICANT HARM TO
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN
In theory, courts should approach the question of treatment for hand-
icapped children in the same way as for otherwise healthy children. Unless
they can explain clearly why appropriate treatment is not in the child's best
interest, they should be expected to adopt a "medical efficacy" standard.
Most courts have been prepared to intervene to preserve the lives of
severely handicapped infants in need of beneficial treatment. 54 However, a
In re Rockowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941) (leg deformity would
deteriorate without treatment); In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fain. Ct.
1970),aff'd, 37 A.D.2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971),aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918,
328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972) (court ordered corrective surgery for severe, but not life-
threatening, facial deformity). But see, e.g.,'In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972)
(remanding to trial court), aff'd on remand, 452 Pa. 373, 307 A.2d 279 (1973) (juvenile who did
not desire surgery to correct spinal curvature was not a neglected child); In re Seiforth, 309
N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955) (court would not interfere with parental decision refusing
surgery to correct child's harelip and cleft palate).
52 People v. Labrenz, 411 I11. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); Luka
v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hospital
v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); State v. Perricone, 37
N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); Hoener v. Bertinate, 67 N.J. Super.
517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961); In re Vasko, 328 A.D.128, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (1933); In re Brooklyn
Hosp., 45 Misc. 2d 914, 258 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
53 See generally Dickens, infra note 49, at 463; Horwitz, infra note 49; Note, Judicial
Limitations on Parental Autonomy in the Medical Treatment of Minors, 59 NEB. L. REv. 1093, 1094
(1980); Note, Birth Defective Infants: A Standard for Non-Treatment Decisions, 30 STAN. L. REv.
599, 609, 613 (1978).
"In re Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Bronx County Sup. Ct. 1979)
(appointed guardian to consent to treatment of a myelomeningocele); In re Jeff and Scott
Mueller, Nos. 81J3000 and 81J301, slip op. (5th Cir. May 15, 1981) (custody awarded to
authorize surgery and medical treatment for separation of Siamese twins jointed at the waist);
In re Elin Daniels, No. 81-15577FJ01, slip. op. (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 23, 1981) (court overrode
parental refusal to treatment with spina bifida infant); In re B [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421 (wardship
granted in order to treat blocked intestine in Down's Syndrome infant); Superintendent of
Family and Child Service and Dawson, 145 D.L.R. (3d) 610 (1983) (interim custody order
granted to treat blockage in shunt for six year old boy with severe multiple mental and
physical handicaps). See also, Portels, The Elin Daniels Case: An Examination of the Legal and
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few courts have upheld parental non-treatment decisions in circumstances
difficult to reconcile with the traditional "best interests" principle.5 5 The
Infant Doe 56 court declined to override a parental decision refusing reme-
dial intestinal surgery for an infant with Down's Syndrome.
In re Phillip B. 5 7 involved a Down's Syndrome child, age 11, whose
parents refused to consent to heart surgery for a ventricular septal defect.
While such surgery is serious, it would be routinely ordered in the case of a
normal child. The court refused to grant a guardianship order because the
parental decision was "within the range of debatable actions." This decision
would follow the established judicial pattern if by "debatable actions" the
court meant there was no medical consensus as to the treatment of choice.
The facts, however, do not support that interpretation.5 8
Infant Doe and Philip B. are not consistent with existing jurisprudence
on parental duties. There is, however, a growing body of well-argued
decisions which recognize that intrusive treatment should not be thrust
upon an incompetent adult or minor unable to live a viable, recognizable
human life.
C. WHERE A CHILD'S "BEST INTERESTS" ARE SERVED BY NON-TREATMENT
The "best interests" principle, as it pertains to the treatment of hand-
icapped people, requires clarification. This essay is based upon the premise
that there may be carefully and narrowly described circumstances in which
an infant's handicaps are so grave, and its potential for human experience
so limited, that life sustaining treatment is not justified. The standards
offered herein may provide a frame of reference for application of the
Ethical Considerations Posed when Parents and Doctors Disagree Whether to Treat a Defective Newborn,
18 FORUM 709 (1983).
11 In Weber v. Stony Brook Hospital, 95 A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685 (N.Y. App. Div.
1983), aff'd on procedural grounds, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1983) the
parents chose a conservative course of treatment with antibiotics instead of surgery for their
spina bifida infant. The court held that this was in the child's "best interests," as conservative
treatment was "well within accepted medical standards" and the infant's life was not in
"imminent danger."
56 Infant Doe, supra note 5. The court's reasoning in this case cannot be analysed because
the judicial record is sealed. See also, Note, Withholding Treatment from Defective Infants: "Infant
Doe" Postmortem, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 224 (1983).
5 In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949
(1980).
" Despite the risk of mortality, which one cardiologist placed at 3-5 percent and another
at 5-10 percent in Philip B., mental retardation texts recommend surgery. Craft, Chromosomal
Abnormalities, in TREDGOLD'S MENTAL RETARDATION 52-53 (M. Craft 12th ed. 1979). The two
cardiologists who gave testimony in the Philip B. case both said that the condition was
surgically correctable. In this context the risk of mortality due to surgery must be balanced
against the certainty of a shortened life if surgery is not performed. See Annas, Denying the
Rights of the Retarded: The Phillip Becker Case, 9 HAST. CEN. RPT. 18 (Dec. 1979).
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"best interests" principle: by using a "medical efficacy test" based upon a
factual assessment of the benefits, risks, and alternatives to treatment,
selective non-treatment decisions would only be made where one of the
three narrow criteria proposed above are met. This would ensure that an
infant's interest in life would be balanced against its constitutional interest
to privacy, including the right to preserve its bodily integrity from intrusive
treatment.
59
Competent adults have always enjoyed the common law right to self-
determination with regard to medical treatment.6" The clear weight of
judicial authority supports the right to choose not to receive any life saving
or life prolonging treatment.6 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the
19 In the PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
(1983) a "higher value than life is proposed namely personal autonomy. Prolongation of a
terminal patient's life imposed over autonomous preference is presented as diminished life,
denied dignity." Dickens, The Final Freedom: Deciding to Forgo Life-Sustaining Treatment, 1984
PuB. L. 34, 35.
60 Under common law, the right of a competent patient to refuse beneficial medical
treatment has been judicially stated on many occasions. See, e.g., Justice Cardozo's oft repeated
principle in Schloendorff v. Society of the New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E.
92, 93 (1914) ("Every human being of adult years and sound mind has the right to determine
what shall be done to his own body ... ."). For a review of the decisions upholding a common
law right to self-determination, see Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 455-56, 426 N.Y.S.2d
517, 536-37 (1980). See also In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d, 1209, 1221-23 (1985); Perna
v. Pirozzi, 92 N.J. 446, 459-65, 457 A.2d 431 (1983); Barber v. Superior Court of State of
California, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 489 (1983). The right of self-
determination which the common law "undoubtedly recognises" is "no more and no less than
the right of a patient to determine himself whether he will or will not accept the doctor's
medical advice." Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1985] 1 All E.R. 643, 649
H.L., per Lord Scarman.
61 One line of cases suggests that where there is no substantial countervailing interest such
as an unborn child or a dependent, an adult patient can refuse a life-saving blood transftusion
provided he or she is conscious and understands the implications of the decision. In re
Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d
27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Annot. 93 A.L.R. 3d 67, 72 (1979).
Specifically, if the refusal of a blood transfusion was based upon religious beliefs, the
court would uphold the patient's decision, e.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. Cir., 1972);
In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill.2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965), but not if the patient was
incompetent and emergency treatment was needed to save his or her life, see, e.g., Application
of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g den., 331
F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978(1964); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v.
Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971), or if the patient were a minor or had a dependent,
see, e.g., Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d at
1007-08, or pregnant, Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, 42 N.J.
421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
Competency of the patient to refuse life-saving treatment has also been the major factor
influencing courts in other contexts. In Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d
1232 (1978), in In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978) and Petition of
Nemser, 51 Misc. 2d 616, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624 (1966), courts would not allow applications to
override the refusal of a patient to consent to the amputation of a gangrenous leg because of
insufficient evidence of their incompetence. Similar facts were present in State Dep't of
Human Service v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978), appeal dismissed as moot,
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right to privacy is broad enough to encompass the "freedom to care for
one's health and person,' 62 and most courts have relied on this constitu-
tional principle in their decisions on life sustaining treatment. 63 This right,
however, is not absolute. The courts may intervene where an individual's
right to privacy conflicts with a recognized State interest.64 The patient's
436 U.S. 923 (1978), but in that case the court held the patient was competent and the refusal
of an amputation could be overridden. In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (1973), the court
refused to appoint a guardian for the purpose of consenting to medical treatment for breast
cancer on evidence that the patient was competent and had no children. There are a large
number of cases where courts have supported substitute decisions to remove life support
systems from dying patients; all save two, Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1980), and Bartling & Bartling v. Superior Court, 85
Daily J. D.A.R. 83 (Cal. 1985), involved comatose or other clearly incompetent patients and
are not dealt with in note 66, infra. Similarly, courts have been prepared to honor the rational
decision of a competent patient not to undergo life-prolonging treatment such as renal dialysis
even though he has since become comatose. In re Lydia E. Hall, Hosp., 116 Misc. 2d 477, 455
N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1982). See generally Annot., 93 A.L.R. 3d 67 (1979); Byrn, Compulsory
Lifesaving Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1975); Cantor, A Patient's
Decision to Decline Life Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26
RUTGERS L. REv. 228 (1973); Kennedy, The Legal Effect of Requests by the Terminally Ill and Aged
Not to Receive Further Treatment From Doctors, 1976 CRIM. L. REv. 217; Montange, Informed
Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632 (1974); Note, Voluntary Active Euthanasia for the
Terminally Ill and the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 363, 369-79.
62 Doe v. Bolton 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). See also, Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (a woman's right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy was
conditionally protected under the rubric of privacy); see supra note 2.
63 Severns v. Wilmington Med. Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); Satz v. Perlmut-
ter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Lane v.
Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super.
282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978); Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977);
Suenram v. Society of Valley Hospital, 155 N.J. Super. 593, 383 A.2d 143 (1977); In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (1973). Other
courts have taken the view that, while a right of privacy may apply to cases where patients
refuse life-sustaining treatment, it is not necessary so to decide since the right is embraced
within the common law principle of self-determination. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,
348, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (Sup. Ct. 1985), In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 376-77, 420 N.E.2d 64,
78, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 272-73, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 58 (1981).
64 Several courts have identified various state interests in requiring life-sustaining treat-
ment to be given against the wishes of dying patients. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 348-55, 486
A.2d 1209, 1223-26 (1985); In re Colyer, 99 Wash.2d 114, 122, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (1983); Saltz
v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. App. 1978); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 640, 405
N.E.2d 115, 123 (1980); Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 261, 399
N.E.2d 452, 456 (1970); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Sup. Ct. 1977); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 339 (Minn. 1984);
Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984). These state
interests include:
(i) The preservation of life, which is generally considered the most important of the state
interests. This interest is weakest where a competent patient refuses life-sustaining treatment
and where prolongation of life is temporary and artificial. Therefore, it will "usually not
foreclose a competent person from declining life-sustaining medical treatment for himself." In
re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 349, 486 A.2d at 1223. It would be a different matter if some other actual
or potential life were at stake which could not adequately protect itself. See, e.g., State v.
Pericone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890(1962); Muhlenberg Hospital v.
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right to self-determination may also be eclipsed by the interests of parties
other than the patient, e.g., those of a near-term fetus or a dependent
child.6 5 Nevertheless, absent a substantial competing interest, the compe-
tent patient has the choice to refuse life-sustaining treatment.
Although infants cannot express their own wishes, their interests
should, nonetheless, be measured in the same manner as those of an
incompetent adult. The tact that incompetent adults cannot determine
where their interests lie has not prevented courts from extending to them
the right to refuse treatment. 6 The threshhold decisions concern how the
Patterson, 128 N.J. Super. 498, 320 A.2d 518 (Law. Div. 1974) (both, in effect, requiring blood
transfusion to save infant's life over parents' refusal to consent).
(ii) The prevention of suicide. See Application of the President & Directors of
Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, reh'gdenied, 331 F.2d 1010, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978
(1964); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971);
State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962). The state
interest in the prevention of suicide is least significant where the patient retains a basic wish to
live and where the affliction is not self-induced. See Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252
N.Y.S. 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
(iii) The maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession. See Application of
the President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1010, reh. denied, 331 F.2d
1010, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971). The force of this
interest is lessened by the prevailing medical ethical standards, which do not invariably
demand that all efforts toward life prolongation be made. See Bryn, Compulsory Lifesaving
Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44 FORtHAM L. REV. 1 (1975). Further the individual right to
self-determination usually outweighs institutional considerations.
(5 A state interest of some potential magnitude is the protection of third parties, particu-
larly minor children, from harm resulting from the decision of a competent adult to refuse life
saving or life-prolonging treatment. See, e.g., Application of the President & Directors of
Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F,2d 1000, reh. denied, 331 F.2d 1010, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978
(1964); Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp. of Joliet, Ill., 340 F. Supp. 125 (D. I11. 1972); Hamilton v.
McAuliffe, 277 Md. 336, 353 A.2d 634 (1976); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752
(D.C. Conn. 1965). This interest is insignificant where the patient's family are all adults and
are all in agreement with his wishes. See, e.g., Saltz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). See also, Annot. 93 A.L.R. 3d 67, 82-83
(1979). The interest of minors has often been overstated, for in cases of life-prolonging rather
than life-saving treatment, the minor would not benefit from the slow anguished death of a
parent as opposed to a quicker natural death. Other "third party" interests which have been
upheld include compulsory treatment for the. protection of public health, see, e.g., Jacobson v.
Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory smallpox vaccination) and to prevent serious risk to
prison security, see, e.g., Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 263, 265, 399
N.E.2d 452, 457, 458 (prisoner must submit to kidney dialysis rather than be transferred to a
lower security prison). Accord, In re Caulk, 125 N.H. 226, 480 A.2d 93 (1984).
66 There is now substantial judicial support for the proposition that the rights to self-
determination and/or to privacy, sometimes resulting in the withholding of life-sustaining
treatment, extends to incompetent patients. The main areas of support can be found in two
lines of cases. The first flows from Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,
373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). The Saikewicz court asked whether there should be any
social and judicial choice not to administer life-prolonging treatment to an incompetent
person. The court answered in the affirmative based upon the "principles of equality and
respect for all individuals." Recognition of the right to refuse treatment "must extend to the
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incompetent individual's interests are to be assessed, and who should be
entrusted with making those judgments on the ward's behalf. Courts have
formulated various standards6 7 and procedures 68 for making substitute
case of an incompetent, as well as a competent, patient because the value of human dignity
extends to both. The court concluded that the interests of an incompetent person are "not
necessarily served by imposing on such persons results not mandated as to competent persons
similarly situated," because it would treat the ward as a person of "lesser status or dignity." 373
Mass. at 746, 370 N.E.2d at 427-28. Courts have consistently followed this part of the
reasoning in Saikewicz. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (1985); In re
Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
The second line of cases are those following the decision of the New Jersey Supreme
Court in In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
Karen Quinlan was in an irreversible coma and was being kept'alive through the use of life
support systems. She had virtually no choice of returning to a "cognitive sapient life." 70 N.J.
at 26, 355 A.2d at 655. All the courts which have followed Quinlan have agreed that the
extremely poor prognosis and the high degree of bodily invasion involved in sustaining the
life of a permanently comatose patient meant her right of privacy outweighed the state's
interest in preserving her life. Courts have, however, insisted on varying procedures to
effectuate the right to privacy. See, e.g., In re Hamlin, 102 Wash.2d 810, 689 P.2d 738 (1983);
Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493 (1983); John
F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); In re Torres,
357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); Leach v. Akron Gen. Med. Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426
N.E.2d 809 (1980); Severns v. Wilmington Med. Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); Eichner
v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980), aff'd sub nom., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363,
420 N.E.2d 64 (1981). In re Lydia E. Hall Hosp., 116 Misc. 2d 477,455 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct.
1982), was not wholly on point because the patient herself, while still competent, expressly
stated her wish to be removed from kidney dialysis when she slipped into a coma. Courts have
even been prepared to rule that treatment of a terminally ill incompetent patient is not
necessary before the fact. A "no code" or "do not resuscitate" (DNR) order, entered in the
medical record of a terminally ill incompetent patient, directs the hospital staff not to apply
intrusive resuscitative measures in the event of cardiac or respiratory failure. Such orders have
been upheld by the courts. See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601
(1982); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978).
67 Compare In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (laying down three separate
standards: Subjective ("substitute judgment") test-where it is clear the particular patient would
have refused the treatment in the circumstances; limited objective test-treatment can be
terminated for a nursing home resident with severe and permanent mental impairments and
limited life expectancy where patient has not unequivocally expressed his desires before
becoming incompetent and it is clear treatment would merely prolong suffering; pure objective
("best interests") test-in the absence of any trustworthy evidence of patient's views, treatment
can be withheld from nursing home resident of above description when burdens of life
markedly outweigh benefits so that recurring, unavoidable, and severe pain of life with the
treatment would be inhumane) with Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1021,
195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493 (1983) (adopting relevant factors set out by PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RE-
SEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 134-35 (1983): relief of suffering,
the preservation or restoration of functioning, the quality as well as the extent of the life
sustained, and the impact on those closest to the patient). See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 396-98,
486 A.2d 1244, 1248-50 (1985) (Handler, J., dissenting in part).
" Courts considered the issue of withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment have used
different procedures to exercise the incompetent's right to privacy. The New Jersey Supreme
Court, for example, has allowed the patient's guardian to make the decision in certain
circumstances. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (.1976)
(guardian can make decision when patient is irreversibly comatose and family, attending
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judgments, but none have entirely precluded the notion that the interests
of the ward may in some circumstances best be served by withholding
treatment. "Living will" statutes, which allow a person to indicate his or her
preference for treatment in the event of becoming incompetent, are consis-
tent with the judicially established principle that incompetent patients
retain their right to privacy. 69 Children also retain a right to substitute
judgments and, at times, non-treatment may best serve their interests.7
The determining legal and moral factors should include the severity of the
handicap, the hopelessness of the prognosis, and the intrusiveness of the
treatment. It should not, however, consider the patient's chronological age.
In cases concerning handicapped children, courts have been reluctant
to countenance parental decisions which would result in the child's early
physician and hospital prognosis committee concur); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 375, 383-85, 486
A.2d at 1237, 1241-42 (1985) (concurrence of above parties not entirely appropriate in cases
of incompetent nursing home resident who is not permanently comatose; interested person
such as guardian, close family member, attending physician of nursing home to notify Office
of Ombudsman; evidence of patient's condition to be furnished by attending physician and
nurses, and two independent physicians to confirm medical condition and prognosis; if the
two physicians supply necessary medical foundation, guardian, with concurrence of attending
physician, may withhold treatment if he believes in good faith that one of the appropriate tests
is satisfied; ombudsman must concur in decision; if limited or pure objective test used, family
or next of kin must also concur).
The Massachusetts Supreme Court, on the whole, has preferred prior judicial review of
cases where life sustaining treatment is to be withdrawn from an incompetent patient.
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E. 2d 417
(1977). That court had to make clear inIn re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466,380 N .E.2d 134
(1978) that a court order was not required before a physician could insert a "do not resusci-
tate" order into a patient's record. But where there were no family members willing to make a
decision in concurrence with medical staff for a "DNR" order, judicial review was held to be
appropriate. Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982).
The Washington Supreme Court instituted tle following procedure for determining
whether to terminate life-sustaining treatment for an incompetent patient who has no avail-
able family: general guardian must be appointed; if treating physicians and prognosis commit-
tee are unanimous and guardian concurs, medical approval is not required; conflicts within or
between the hospital, prognosis committee, attending physicians, or guardian should be
determined by trial court. In re Hamlin, 102 Wash.2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984), modifying In
re Colyer, 99 Wash.2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983). The different procedures in Quinlan,
Saikewicz, and Colyer are discussed in Note, The Incompetent's Right to Refuse Treatment, 51 TENN.
L. REV. 145 (1983).
69 A number of legislatures have recognized the validity of "living wills." See, e.g., CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 887185-95 (West Supp. 1985). The National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws has submitted a proposal for a uniform act recognizing the
enforceability of "living wills" in certain circumstances. Whether or not they are legally
binding, such wills are relevant evidence of a patient's intent. John F. Kennedy Memorial
Hospital, Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984).
70 See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(constitutional right to privacy of a ten-month-old terminally ill child wholly lacking in
cognitive brain functioning and completely unaware of his surroundings could be exercised by
his legal guardians by discontinuing life support system). The Florida Supreme Court spec-
ifically supported this analysis in John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Bludworth, 452
So. 2d 921, 926 (1984).
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death without treatment.7" Nevertheless, even those courts with vitalist
preconceptions have not foreclosed the possibility that a minor's interests
may best be served by non-treatment. The English Court of Appeal asked
"whether the life of the child is demonstrably going to be so awful that in
effect the child must be condemned to die . 72 In opting for treatment
in the particular case of a Down's Syndrome infant with an intestinal
blockage, Lord Templeman said: "There may be cases ... of severe proved
damage where the future is so certain and where the life of the child is
bound to be so full of pain and suffering that the court might be driven to a
different conclusion. 73
The Court in In re Cicero, 74 while noting that surgery for a spina bifida
infant would give the child "a reasonable chance to live a useful, fulfilled
life," left open the possibility of a different decision when confronted with
"a 'hopeless' life." Custody of a Minor75 presented such a "hopeless life," an
infant suffering from cyanotic heart disease which at the time was incor-
rectable. In this case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld a
juvenile court order that "if cardiac and/or respiratory onset occurs, no
heroic life saving treatment should be administered. ' 76 The court
analogized to the case of an incompetent terminally ill adult; this would
raise "the issue of whether and by what means a person has the right to
refuse the invasion of his or her bodily integrity by refusing extraordinary
medical treatment. '77 The court based its decision on narrow facts: an
incurable illness, intrusive treatment, and the potential for "agony and
suffering."
IV. LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER
SELECTIVE NON-TREATMENT DECISIONS
On May 15, 1985, new regulations were enacted to guide the treatment
and care of handicapped infants. These regulations implemented the Child
71 See supra, note 51-53.
72 1n re B. [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421, 1424. This passage was quoted with approval in the
Canadian case of Superintendent of Family and Child Services v. R.D., supra note 53, at 623.
The Canadian case involved a six year old severely mentally retarded boy with no control over
his faculties, limbs or bodily functions. His parents refused consent to surgery necessary to
correct a blockage in a shunt. The court said "[t]here looms the awful possibility that without
the shunt the child will endure in a state of progressing disability and pain. It is too simplistic
to say that the child should be allowed to die in peace." The court granted an interim custody
order to ensure treatment, but left open the possibility of a different conclusion in cases of
terminally ill children whose lives are "imponderable." See Sneideman, The Stephen Dawson
Case: Whose Decision is it Anyway? 14 MAN. L.J. 165 (1984).
73 1n re B. [1981], 1 W.L.R. 1421, 1424.
74 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965, 968 (Bronx County Sup. Ct. 1979).
7' 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982).7 1Id. at 712, 434 N.E.2d at 609.
17 Id. at 708, 434 N.E.2d at 607.
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Abuse Amendments of 1984. This section contains a brief examination of
previous attempts to regulate treatment decisions relating to handicapped
infants pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. An
analysis of the new regulations follows, comparing them with the standard
previously proposed.
A. HHS RULES BASED UPON SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF
1973
On April 12, 1982, the court in In re Infant Doe75 chose not to intercede
in a parental decision to withhold surgery, food, and water from a Down's
Syndrome infant born with a tracheo-oesophageal fistula. 79 This condition
prevents food from reaching the stomach and usually calls for corrective,
albeit serious, surgery for an otherwise physically and mentally healthy
child. The infant died six days after birth.
TheInfant Doe case spurred governmental response. On April 30,
1982 President Reagan sent a memorandum instruction to the Secretary of
Health and Human Services ("HHS") directing the Secretary to notify
health care providers that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197380
applies to the treatment of handicapped infants.8 ' This section prohibits
discrimination against handicapped persons by federal fund recipients.
The HHS Director of the Office of Civil Rights issued the notice on May 18,
1982.82
7
8 Infant Doe, supra note 5.
71 See supra note 6.
10 Section 504 provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the
United States ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance .... " 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
"I The legislative history of the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 cites the Infant Doe
case as giving rise to the President's memorandum to the Attorney General (who was ordered
to report on the constitutional and statutory remedies available to prevent withholding of
medical treatment from handicapped persons). It also cites the decision to withhold treatment
from siamese twins who were born handicapped in Danville, Illinois which resulted in a
custody battle and filing of criminal charges against the parents and attending physicians.
Legislative History, supra note 9, at 2922-23.
11 Discrimination Against the Handicapped by Withholding Treatment or Nourishment:
Notice of Health Care Providers, 47 FED. REG. 26,027 (1982) (applying 45 C.F.R. § 84 to
health services for handicapped children). The notice states that:
It is unlawful ... to withhold from a handicapped infant nutritional sustenance or
medical or surgical treatment required to correct a life threatening condition if (1)
the withholding is based on the fact that the infant is handicapped; and (2) the
handicap does not render the treatment or nutritional sustenance medically con-
traindicated.
The notice also recognized that Federal fund recipients did not have total control over
treatment, but suggested parental withholding of consent for treatment should not be aided
by allowing the infant to remain in the institution; failure to comply with § 504 subjected
recipients "to possible termination of federal assistance."
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On March 7, 1983, the Secretary of HHS promulgated an interim final
regulation under Section 504. Among other things, this required federally
assisted health care institutions to display conspicuous notices advising that
federal law prohibits discriminatory failure to feed and provide care for
handicapped infants. 8 3 The District Court for the District of Columbia
invalidated the regulation in American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler.8 4
Judge Gesell concluded that the interim final regulation constituted an
arbitrary and capricious agency action .8  Furthermore, the court found
that the Secretary had failed to follow procedural requirements in its
promulgation .86
Despite Judge Gesell's ruling, HHS issued a new "proposed rule" on
July 5, 1983 which essentially restated the initial rule. 7 After reviewing and
analyzing comments on the proposed rule, the HHS issued its "final rule"
on January 12, 1984.88 These regulations were set aside in American Hospital
83 Non-Discrimination on the Basis of Handicaps, 48 FED. REG. 9630 (1983) (modifying 45
C.F.R. § 84.61). The notice advised any person having knowledge of proscribed discrimina-
tion to contact a toll free HHS "hotline" or the child protection agency. The regulation also
authorized HHS to conduct immediate investigation to protect the health or life or handicap-
ped infants.
84 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983).
'6 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A); which extends the scope
of judicial review to holding unlawful and setting aside agency action which is "arbitrary or
capricious." Judge Gesell said the record reflected no consideration of: the disruptive effects a
24 hour "hotline" upon the treatment of newborns; the effects of forced removal of an infant
from hospital if the parent refuses to consent to treatment; whether termination of painful
intrusive treatment might be appropriate where the infant's clear prognosis is death within a
few days or months. Academy of Pediatrics, 561 F. Supp. at 399-400.
86 The court found that the rule was not issued in accordance with either the public notice
or 30 day delay-of-effective date requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 553 (b) & (d); the Secretary also failed to demonstrate good cause why the Administrative
Procedure Act notice procedures should be waived. Academy of Pediatrics, 561 F. Supp. at
400-01.
87 Non-discrimination on the Basis of Handicap Relation to Health Care for Handicap-
ped Infants, Proposed Rule, 48 FED. REG. 30,846 (July 5, 1983) (proposed rules modifying 45
C.F.R. 84.61).
88 Non-Discrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and Activities Receiving or
Benefitting from Federal Financial Assistance: Procedures and Guidelines Relating to Health
Care for Handicapped Infants, Final Rule, 49 FED. REG. 1622, 45 C.F.R. 84.55 (1984). These
provided, inter alia, as follows: (a) Infant Care Review Committee (ICRC) in recipient health care
institutions were encouraged but not mandated; (b) Posting of informational notice where health
care professionals, but not necessarily parents, could see it. The notice drew attention to
proscribed discrimination under Section 504 whereby nourishment and medically beneficial
treatment are withheld solely on grounds of infant's present or anticipated impairments, and
gave telephone numbers of hospital contact (where there was one), appropriate child protec-
tion agency and a 24 hour "hotline" at HHS; (c) Responsibilities of Recipient State Child Protection
Agency to use full authority to prevent instances of unlawful neglect including, where appro-
priate, on-site investigation of such reports and timely applications for court orders for life-
sustaining treatment; (d) Expedited Access to Records which was not limited to business hours
when necessary to protect life or heath of a handicapped individual.
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Association v. Heckler89 because they were promulgated without statutory
authority pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.9° The American
Hospital Association decision was directly controlled by United States v. Univer-
sity Hospital, State University of New York. 9' In that case, "Baby Jane Doe" was
born with multiple birth defects including spina bifida, 92 microcephaly
93
and hydrocephalus. 94 Dual corrective surgical procedures were refused by
the parents, and HHS sought access to the infant's medical records to
determine whether this was a "legitimate medical judgment rather than
based solely on a handicapping condition. '95 HHS based its authority to
conduct an investigation on Section 504. The Court of Appeals found that
Section 504,96 prohibiting "discrimination '97 against "otherwise qual-
ified"9 8 handicapped people, did not reach medical decisions involving
handicapped infants. Thus HHS lacked statutory authority to conduct an
investigation or to compel production of the medical records of Infant
Doe. 99
B. CHILD ABUSE AMENDMENTS OF 1984 AND IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS
The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, originally enacted in
1974, was the first federal legislation focusing on child abuse and ne-
89 No. 84-6211 (2d Cir. Dec. 27, 1984) cert. granted, 105 S.Ct. 3475 (1985).
90 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(C) (1971) (which extends scope of judicial review to set aside agency
action which is in excess of statutory authority).
01 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
02 See supra note 45.
91 Microcephaly is an abnormal smallness of the head in relation to the rest of the body: a
congenital condition in which the brain is not fully developed. CoNcIsE OXFORD MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 392-93 (Corgi ed. 1982).
94 Hydrocephalus is an abnormal increase in the amount of cerebrospinal fluid within the
ventricles of the brain causing an enlarged head in infants. Id. at 298. Spina bifida is
commonly associated with hydrocephalus.
9 United States v. University Hospital, State University of New York, 729 F.2d at 157.
56 See supra note 80 for the text of Section 504.
97 "Where the handicapping condition is related to the condition(s) to be treated, it will
rarely, if ever, be possible to say with certainty that a particular decision was 'discriminatory,'"
United States v. University Hospital, State University of New York, 729 F.2d at 157.
91 Doe v. New York University, 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981), establishes that § 504
prohibits discrimination only where the handicap is unrelated to the services in question.
"[Wlhere medical treatment is at issue, it is typically the handicap itself that gives rise to, or at
least contributes to, the need for services." United States v. University Hospital, State Univer-
sity of New York, 729 F.2d at 156.
99 HHS has consistently defended its right to promulgate regulations pursuant to Section
504 and will, if the prior final regulation is reinstated in subsequent stages of ongoing
litigation, consider any revisions necessary to facilitate coordinated action with the regulations
recently promulgated under the 1984 Amendments to the Child Abuse and Neglect Preven-
tion and Treatment Act of 1974. See Child Abuse Rules, supra note 7. See also infra notes 101-129
and accompanying text. Section 127(a) of the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub.L. 98
Stat. 1749, 1754, (1984) states that no provision of the 1984 Act is intended to'effect any right
or protection under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Congress has estab-
lished a "policy of neutrality" on this legal controversy concerning the applicability of Section
504 to health care for handicapped infants. See 130 CONG. REC. S-12392, daily ed. (Sept. 28,
1984) (Letter from Senators Hatch, Denton, Nickles, Kassebaum, Dodd and Cranston).
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glect."' The Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 extended the Act to cover
the withholding of medically indicated treatment from handicapped in-
fants. '° The Amendments were a "substantial consensus" achieved be-
tween the principal congressional sponsors and a diverse coalition of medi-
cal, pro-life, and disability organizations. 0 2 Section 124 of the Act requires
the Secretary of HHS to publish proposed and final regulations implement-
ing the statutory requirements for responding to medical neglect. The
Secretary is also required to publish interim and final model guidelines to
encourage Infant Care Review Committees.
On December 10, 1984, HHS published a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) 0 a which included a "cookbook" of binding defini-
tions of the statutory phrase "withholding medically indicated treatment."
HHS received more than 116,000 letters in response to the NPRM. Medical
associations, whose support had been essential in achieving the legislative
compromise, argued that the "impossible catalogue of binding definitions"
upset the statute's careful balance." 4 In a letter to HHS, the principal
sponsors of the Act noted that each statutory definition "was chosen with
utmost care" and asked for "every consideration" to ensure that the careful
balance of the statute would not be disturbed.10 5 In the final Child Abuse
Rules, published April 15, 1985, HHS deleted all clarifying definitions
except the two that appeared in the Conference Committee Report.0 6
Instead, the Appendix to the Final Rules contains non-binding "interpre-
tive guidelines" which represent HHS's interpretation of the statutory
language.
The Act of 1984 and implementing regulations have four main provi-
sions, which are summarized below.
1. New Basic State Grant Requirement
Section 4(b)(2)(k) 07 mandates, as a condition to receiving State grant
funds under the Act, that participating State Child Protective Services
agencies establish procedures for reporting medical neglect, including in-
100 Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (codified or amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5101) (1983
& Supp. 1985) [hereinafter cited as the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974].
101 Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, supra note 7.
102 Child Abuse Proposed Rules, supra note 20, at 2.
101 Id. at 48,160.
104 Child Abuse Rules, supra note 7.
15 Id. at 14,879.
106 The two definitions are of the terms "infant" and "reasonable medical judgment." See
infra notes 117 & 120.
"') The effective date of this section is October 9, 1985; funds have been appropriated
under Section 4(C) so the waiver provision is not in effect. Child Abuse and Prevention Act of
1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5103 (b)(2)(K), amended by the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 § 128 (b)(1)(2).
A MOMENT IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
stances of withholding of medically indicated treatment from disabled
infants with life threatening conditions. These procedures must provide
for: coordination and consultation with individuals designated by, and
within, appropriate health care facilities; prompt notification of cases of
suspected medical neglect by individuals designated within these
facilities;10 8 and authority under state law for the child protection service
system to pursue legal, including judicial,' 0 9 remedies to prevent the with-
holding of medically indicated treatment from disabled infants with life
threatening conditions." 0
Furthermore, state reporting procedures must comply with pertinent
existing requirements for State Child Protective Services set out in the
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act and Regulations."' t In particu-
lar, the Child Protective Services agency must have procedures to obtain, in
a manner consistent with state law, medical records necessary for the
investigation of reported medical neglect. A court order or other method
for obtaining an independent medical examination of the infant must also
be available when necessary to resolve a report of medical neglect." 2
The most important feature of the new basic state grant requirement
is its incorporation of existing child abuse and neglect reporting and
investigation requirements to cases of withholding medically indicated
treatment from disabled infants. The Child Abuse provisions are neither as
specific nor as intrusive as those requiring "conspicuous notices," reporting
"hotlines," and "investigation squads" contained in various stages of the
Section 504-based regulations." 3 They also materially differ from the
108 The programs and/or procedures must specify that the child protective services will
promptly contact each health care facility to obtain the name, title and telephone number of
individuals designated by such facilities for the purposes of coordination, consultation and
notification activities, and will at least annually recontact each facility to obtain any changes in
the designations. Child Abuse Rules,supra note 7, (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 (c)(3)).
109 In every case which results in a judicial proceeding, the state must ensure the ap-
pointment of a guardian ad litem to represent and protect the rights and best interests of the
infant. Child Abuse Rules, supra note 7 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(g)).
110 Child Abuse Rules, supra note 7 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(c)(1)(2)). Specific
statutory reference to the authority to institute legal proceedings is made in the Act only
because of the uncertainties of particular child protective agencies to take such action in cases
involving withholding of medically indicated treatment from disabled infants. Legislative
History, supra note 9, at 2971.
111 Child Abuse Rules, supra note 7 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(c)(4)). The
provision for reporting and investigating child abuse are set out in the Child Abuse Rules
supra note 7 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14 (c) and (d)), and are applicable to
withholding of medically indicated treatment from disabled infants. The 'reporting' provi-
sions require only that states must provide by statute that specified persons must report cases
of child abuse and neglect to the child protective agency, and that any other person is
permitted to report. The provision for "prompt investigation" may include reporting hotlines,
field investigations and interviews, home visits, and medical, psychological and social assess-
ments. HHS surveys the various state requirements for reporting and investigating in the
Child Abuse Proposed Rules, supra note 20, 49 FED. REG. at 48,161-63.
I2 Child Abuse Rules, supra note 7 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(c)(4)).
..
3See supra notes 78-99 and accompanying text.
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Section 504-based rules in that they are implemented and enforced by
state, rather than federal, intervention.
2. Definition of "Withholding Medically Indicated Treatment"
"Medical neglect" means the failure to provide adequate medical
care." 4 This includes, but is not limited to, the withholding of medically
indicated treatment from a disabled infant with a life-threatening condi-
tion. 1 5 Section 316 defines the term "withholding of medically indicated
treatment" as "the failure to respond to the infant's 1 7 life threatening
conditions' 1 8 by providing treatment" 9 (including appropriate nutrition,
"14 The concept of "medical neglect" should be understood within the wider context of
the definition of "child abuse and neglect" in section 3 of the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5102, and in the Child Abuse Rules, supra note 7 (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2 (d)): "The physical or mental injury, sexual abuse, sexual
exploitation, negligent treatment, or maltreatment of a child by a person responsible for the
child's welfare under circumstances indicating harm or threatened harm to the child's health
or welfare ......
I" Child Abuse Rules, supra note 7 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 (b)(1)).
il6 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5102, as amended by
the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, § 121, supra note 7.
117 The term "infant" means: "an infant less than one year of age." The reference to less
than one year of age should not be construed to imply that treatment should be changed or
discontinued when an infant reaches one year of age, or to affect or limit any existing
protections against medical neglect under state law. Thus, the principal focus of the new
Child Abuse provisions are for infants under one year old. In such cases the precisely defined
standards in the 1984 Amendment and accompanying regulations must be used. For infants
over this age, the more general standard of "medical neglect" is to be used. But the more
precise standards should be consulted thoroughly in the evaluation of any issue of medical
neglect involving an infant over the age of one year who has been continuously hospitalized
since birth, who was born prematurely or who has a long term disability. Congressional intent
is to recognize that these categories of infant share important characteristics with infants
under one year of age. The Child Abuse Rules supra note 7 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R.
§ 1340.15 (b)(3)(i)); Legislative History,supra note 9, 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2970.
Note that the Child Abuse Proposed Rules stated that the term "infant" always included these
three categories of infants over one year of age. The change reflects the intent of the Joint
Sponsors that such infants "may" be included. HHS believes that a thorough consideration of
the more precise standards should permit an informed judgment on whether they are the
most appropriate bases for evaluation of the medical neglect issue. Chile Abuse Rules, supra
note 7, 50 FED. REG. at 14,882. It remains unclear, however, in what circumstances the more
precise standards apply to infants who fall within one of the three categories. A "thorough
evaluation" of the standards doesn't give any comprehensive indication of whether those
standards are to apply in the case in question. Finally, HHS resisted calls for specific inclusion
of infants born alive after attempted abortion; but it made clear that infancy begins at the
point of live births, regardless of the circumstances of the live birth.
"I HHS interprets "life threatening condition" to include a condition that, in the treating
physician's reasonable medical judgment significantly increases the risk of the onset of compli-
cations that may threaten the life of the infant. Thus the Child Abuse provisions would apply
in cases where the condition itself was not life threatening (e.g. the risk of serious infection in
an open myclomeningocele which is not operated upon). Child Abuse Rules, supra note 7 (to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340, Appendix, 2).
... HHS interprets the term "treatment" in two contexts: (i) in the context of adequate
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hydration, and medication) which, in the physician's reasonable medical
judgment12 ° will be most likely to be effective in ameliorating or correcting
all such conditions ...... Under the Act, all instances of withholding of
appropriate nutrition, hydration or medication from disabled infants with
life threatening conditions are forms of medical neglect, irrespective of the
circumstances.1 21
The Act does not consider the withholding of medically indicated
treatment to be "medical neglect" under the following circumstances:
(a) When the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose;
(b) When the treatment would-
(i) merely prolong dying;1 22
(ii) not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the
infant's life-threatening condition;123 or
evaluation-"treatment" includes (but is not limited to) "any further evaluation at a facility with
specialized capabilities regarding the condition(s) involved that, in the treating physician's
reasonable medical judgment, is needed to assure that decisions regarding medical interven-
tion are based on adequate knowledge about the case and the treatment possibilities with
respect to the medical conditions involved." This reflects HHS' interpretation that failure to
respond to an infant's life threatening conditions by obtaining further or more specialized
evaluation which in the physician's opinion is needed could amount to medical neglect. (ii) In
the context of multiple treatments-"treatment includes (but is not limited to) multiple medical
treatments and/or surgical procedures over a period of time that are designed to ameliorate or
correct a life threatening condition or conditions." In evaluating whether treatment is "effec-
tive," "futile" or "inhumane," the benefits and adverse effects not merely of one medical
procedure, but of an entire plan of treatment, should be considered. Child Abuse Rules, supra
note 7 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340, Appendix, 3-4).
120 The term "reasonable medical judgment" means one "made by a reasonably prudent
physician, knowledgeable about the case and the treatment possibilities with respect to the
medical conditions involved." Child Abuse Rules, supra note 7 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R.
§ 1340.15 (b)(3)(ii)).
121 Child Abuse Rules, supra note 7 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340, Appendix, 1).
122 HHS interprets the term "merely prolong dying" as "referring to situations where the
prognosis is for death and, in the treating physician's reasonable medical judgment, further or
alternative treatment would not alter the prognosis in an extension of time that would render
the treatment futile." Child Abuse Rules, supra note 7 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340,
Appendix, 5). The phrase "death is imminent and treatmeht will do no more than postpone
the act of dying" in the Child Abuse Proposed Rules,supra note 20, is deleted in the final rules.
123 The term "not to be effective in ameliorating or correcting all the infant's life-threaten-
ing conditions" means that, if the disabled infant suffers from more than one life-threatening
condition and, in the physician's reasonable medical judgment, there is no effective treatment
for one of those conditions, then the infant is not covered by the Amendment except with
respect to nutrition, hydration and medication. Legislative History, supra note 9, 4 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2970. HHS' interpretation is that the term "not be effective in
ameliorating or correcting all the infant's life-threatening conditions" does not permit the
withholding of treatment in the following two circumstances: (i) in the context of a future
life-threatening condition-where one or more of the infant's life-threatening conditions, al-
though not life threatening in the near future, will become so in the more distant future. An
example given in the Proposed Rules, supra note 20, 49 FED. REG. at 48,164, was an infant with
a duodenal atresia (a lack of opening in the duodenum) and a second condition such as Down's
Syndrome or Tay Sach's disease, in which case surgery to unblock the duodenum should be
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(iii) otherwise be futile in terms of survival of the infant;' 2 4
(c) The treatment would be virtually futile1 25 in terms of the
survival of the infant and the treatment itself under the cir-
cumstances would be inhumane.
26
The selective non-treatment decision, in the above circumstances, must be
made in the exercise of the physician's reasonable medical judgment.
3. Additional State Grants and Assistance for Training, Technical
Assistance and Clearinghouse Activities
Section 4(c)( 1)127 authorizes, but does not mandate, the Secretary to
make additional grants to states to develop, establish, operate, or imple-
ment procedures or programs for responding to medical neglect under
Section 4(b)(2)(k).' 2 s The grants would also provide information, educa-
tion, and training programs for professionals, paraprofessionals, and par-
ents of disabled infants with life threatening conditions. Other grants
would be available to set up programs to help obtain or coordinate neces-
sary services, e.g., assisting family access to existing social and health ser-
vices and financial assistance. Finally, grant funds may facilitate adoptive
placement of unwanted infants.
performed. (ii) In the context of palliative treatment-where ameliorative treatment, in the
treating physician's reasonable medical judgment, will make a condition more tolerable, such
as relieving severe pain, even if the overall prognosis is that the infant will not survive. Thus, if
the infant has one life-threatening condition that will cause death in the near future, humane
treatment, for example, to relieve severe pain, should be administered. Child Abuse Rules,
supra note 7 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340, Appendix, 6-7).
124 The term "otherwise futile in terms of survival of the infant" is not discussed in the
interpretive guidelines. Its clear meaning is that, even with the treatment, the infant would
die. But the issue is when the infant is expected to die. See infra text accompanying notes
150-61. To examine whether treatment is "futile" an entire plan of treatment should be
considered. See supra note 119.
"I HHS's interpretation of the term "virtually futile" is that treatment is highly unlikely to
prevent death in the near future." Child Abuse Rules, supra note 7 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R.
§ 1340, Appendix, 8).
126 HHS's interpretation of the term "the treatment itself under such circumstances would
be inhumane" is that the "treatment itself involves significant medical contraindications and/or
significant pain and suffering for an infant highly unlikely to survive." Child Abuse Rules,
supra note 7 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340, Appendix, 8). The use of the term
"inhumane" in the Act "is not intended to suggest that consideration of the humaneness of a
particular treatment is not legitimate in any other context; rather it is recognized that it is
appropriate for a physician, in the course of reasonable medical judgment, to consider that
factor in selecting among effective treatments." Legislative History, supra note 9, U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2970.
127 The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5103 (1984 &
Supp. 1985), as amended by § 123 of the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, supra note 7.
1218 For the provisions of § 4(b)(2)(k) of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act,
see supra notes 107-113 and accompanying text. Section 4(c)(2) of the Act mandates the
Secretary to provide, either directly or through grants or contracts with public or non-profit
organizations, for training and technical assistance programs to assist States with meeting the
program and procedure requirements of § 4(b)(2)(k).
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Section 4(c)(2) 1 29 requires the Secretary to provide, either directly, or
through grants or contracts with public or private non-profit organizations,
internal and regional clearinghouses providing current and complete in-
formation regarding medical treatment and community services for dis-
abled infants with life-threatening conditions. The clearinghouses will
compile, maintain, and disseminate regional directories of community ser-
vices, as well as the names and telephone numbers of state and local
medical organizations. They will also assist in coordinating the availability
of appropriate regional education resources for health care personnel. The
primary purpose of these clearinghouse efforts is to assist physicians, other
professionals, and parents in providing treatment and services for these
infants.
The foregoing additional grants focus principally upon the time pe-
riod when treatment decisions have to be made. The Child Abuse Amend-
ment allocates funds for reporting procedures, teaching, and providing
information for health care professionals and parents, but does not mate-
rially expand the health, social and habilitation services now available to
improve the quality of the handicapped person's life.
4. Model Guidelines to Establish "Infant Care Review Committees"
a. Form and Function of the ICRC
The Secretary has published interim and final Model Guidelines to
encourage the establishment of Infant Care Review Committees (ICRCs)
within health care facilities. 130 The ICRSs would educate hospital person-
nel and families of disabled infants with life threatening conditions, rec-
ommend institutional policies and guidelines concerning the withholding
of medically indicated treatment from such infants, and review cases in-
volving disabled infants with life-threatening conditions. The model guide-
lines encourage the establishment of ICRCs in hospitals that provide health
care to infants, particularly those hospitals with tertiary-level neonatal care
units. The Model Guidelines contain detailed provisions relating to the
membership,131 administration1 3 2 and educational activities1 33 of ICRCs.
29 The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5102 (1984), as
amended by § 123 of the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, supra note 7. Not more than $1
million of the funds appropriated for any fiscal year under § 5 may be used to carry out § 4
(c)(2). For a further discussion of clearinghouse activities, see Child Abuse Rules, supra note 7,
50 FED. REG. 14,884.
130 Interim Model Guidelines for Health Care Providers to Establish Infant Care Review
Committee; Notice, 49 FED. REG. 48,170 (1984); Model Guidelines for Health Care Providers
to Establish Infant Care Review Committee, Notice, 50 FED. REG. 14,893 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as Model Guidelines].
131 The Model guidelines recommend a core multi-disciplinary membership including a
physician, a nurse, administrator, social worker, representative of a disability group, lay
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ICRCs are meant to "prevent the withholding of medically indicated
treatment from disabled infants with life threatening conditions."' 3 4 Under
the model guidelines, the ICRC should recommend specific policies and
guidelines for the hospital which cover the management of specific types of
cases and internal review procedures to be followed when such cases occur.
The ICRC may require attending physicians to notify it of the presence of
an infant with such a specified diagnosis. The ICRC should review existing
hospital procedures or recommend new procedures to facilitate effective
cooperation and coordination between the hospital and state child protec-
tive services. Under the Model Guidelines, the ICRC should review all
records involving selective non-treatment decisions to infants. Any devia-
tions from institutional policies should be reviewed and reported.
b. Prospective Review and Counsel in Specified Cases
The model guidelines further suggest that the hospital, to the extent
possible, require in each case that life sustaining treatment continue until
the ICRC can review the case and provide advice. In certain circumstances,
emergency meetings should be convened within 24 hours or less.1 35 The
ICRC should designate one of its members as a "special advocate" for the
infant. This person should ensure that all factors favoring the provision of
treatment are fully considered.
In cases where disagreement exists between the physician and the
infant's family, the Model Guidelines offer certain substantive recommen-
dations:
member and a member of the facility's medical staff to serve as chairperson; the core
membership could be supplemented with, for example, a lawyer or a representative of the
clergy.
132 The Model Guidelines recommend that hospitals should provide the ICRC with staff
support including legal counsel; the ICRC should recommend procedures to ensure that
hospital personnel and patient families are informed of its functions and 24 hour availability;
the ICRC should inform itself of all pertinent legal requirements and procedures in state law
regarding medical neglect; and the ICRC should maintain confidential records of its delibera-
tions and summaries of specific cases.
133 The Model Guidelines recommend that ICRCs should provide full and current in-
formation to hospital personnel and families concerning medical treatment and resources
including information about clearinghouses, community and rehabilitation services and coun-
selling, supportive services, and adoption placement counselling.
134 The definitions in the Child Abuse Act and Rules are applicable to the Model Guide-
lines, and constitute the substance of the basic policy of ICRCs. HIHS also recommends careful
review of its "interpretive guidelines." See supra notes 114-126 and accompanying text.
'31 That is, when there is a disagreement between the infant's family and physician or
between members of the hospital's medical and/or nursing staff; when a preliminary decision
to withhold treatment is made in certain categories of cases pre-determined by the ICRC: or
when an emergency meeting is requested by a member of the ICRC, hospital staff or parent of
the infant. The confidentiality of persons making a request should be preserved. Emergency
meetings should be open to affected parties and their interests must be fully considered.
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(1) The ICRC should counsel that the family's wishes to continue
treatment should be respected unless the treatment is medically
contra-indicated;
(2) If the family refuses consent to treatment and the ICRC
agrees, the ICRC should counsel that treatment be withheld;
(3) If the ICRC disagrees with the family's refusal of consent,
then it should counsel that the matter be immediately referred to
an appropriate court or child protective services agency, and every
effort should be made to continue treatment. This procedure
should also be used where the family and physician agree that life
sustaining treatment should be withdrawn, but the ICRC dis-
agrees. 1 3 6
The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research in 1983 provided the
thrust for the ICRC proposal.1 37 Since that time, a broad range of medical
and health associations have endorsed the concept.138 Some courts have
been favorably disposed towards consultation with hospital review commit-
tees, 13 9 while others have been more cautious.1 40 Hospital review commit-
tees in the infant care field, or in any other medical ethics context, have not
yet been mandated by the courts or statute.1 41
There is no consensus on how such committees should operate and,
particularly, whether they should be prescriptive or decision-making in
character. The presence of a "special advocate" for the infant, prescriptive
routes to be followed when there are disagreements, and retrospective
review as a "fault finding" exercise support the criticism that the HHS
116 See Model Guidelines, supra note 130, 50 FED. REG. at 14,895-96.
137 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FORGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
(1983).
138 Model Guidelines,supra note 130, 50 FED. REG. at 14,893; See, e.g., AMERICAN HospI-
TAL ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES: HOSPITAL COMMITTEES ON BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (1984); AMER-
ICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, OFFICE OF LEGAL AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, LEGAL ISSUES AND
GUIDANCE FOR HOSPITAL BIOMEDICAL ETHICS COMMITTEES: REPORT OF THE ADJUNCT LEGAL
TASK FORCE IN BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (1985) [hereinafter cited as BIOMEDICAL ETHICS].
139 In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 2332, 2335-36 (Sup. Ct. Minn. 1984); In re L.H.R., slip op.
No. 41,065 (Ga. Sup. Ct. Oct. 16, 1984).
140 Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d
417, 434 (1977) ("We take a dim view of any attempt to shift the ultimate decision-making
responsibility away from the duly established courts of proper jurisdiction to any committee,
panel or group, ad hoc or permanent.").
141 But the court in In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied 429 U.S. 922
(1976), held that an "ethics committee" comprised of physicians to confirm the medical
prognosis was mandated. Accord In re Hamlin, 102 Wash.2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372, 1378 (1984).
This is different from a multidisciplinary committee which examines more diverse medical/
legal/ethical issues.
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Model Guidelines view ICRCs as quasi-judicial, adversarial bodies.' 42 Yet
the regulations can be defended on the ground that a wide ranging mem-
bership with some advocacy role may ensure that full and accurate infor-
mation is available for decision-making. Moreover, multi-disciplinary
decision-making also shows a recognition that the issues require social and
ethical, as well as medical, expertise for their resolution. Where a life is at
stake, it is reasonable to require that treatment continue until a full review
is completed.
In evaluating the Model Guidelines it is important to recognize that
they operate within the restrictive context of the Child Abuse Amendments
of 1984. The basic policy in the Model Guidelines of ensuring that medi-
cally indicated treatment is given in all cases appears to taint the ICRC with
an air of pre-judgment of cases and issues. Yet such a policy is consistent
with the statutory purpose. The prescriptive framework for analyzing such
complex and delicate cases flows from the Act and regulations, not from
the Model Guidelines.
V. ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY STANDARDS
A. CHILD ABUSE STANDARDS MEASURED AGAINST PROPOSED STANDARDS
The standard proposed earlier in this essay differs significantly from
the Child Abuse Rules. The Child Abuse provisions essentially adopt a
vitalist position 143 whereby, with the exception of three highly restrictive
situations, 4 4 any treatment which can ameliorate or correct a life threaten-
ing condition must be administered. As the Senate report on the Child
Abuse Amendments stated:
Under the fundamental tenets of our society, the life of an able-
bodied or disabled human being should not be brought to a
premature end by parental, physician, or hospital committee de-
cree.
4 5
142 The Model Guidelines did not deal with a number of difficult questions which must be
faced by any institutional review committee-e.g., the problems of keeping committee records
and of committee access to patient records including record confidentiality, length and
method of retention of records, parent's access to infant's records; problems of "extended"
confidentiality to include all members of the committee in abiding by hospital rules and state
law; inserting an ethics committee recommendation in the patient's record; discoverability of
committee minutes and whether they should be open to the public or held in confidence;
immunity from liability of members of the committee; boundaries of the subject matter
jurisdiction of the committee; and the role of the attorney who may have a conflict of interest
if he also represents the hospital. See generally BIOMEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 138.
143 See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
144 See supra notes 122-126 and accompanying text.
1 Legislative History, supra note 9, 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2928.
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Such robust vitalism fails to account for people whose disabilities are so
grave, functioning so limited, and pain and suffering so unendurable that
life is not worth aggressively defending. Society increasingly realizes that
the range of justifiable and rational choices can include a decision not to
endure life in its hopeless and terminal stages. Courts have followed suit by
defending the individual's right to refuse intrusive treatment. As discussed
in the section analysing case law,146 this right to refuse treatment, based
upon clear and narrow "quality of life"' 47 criteria, has been extended to
incompetent adults; it would be iniquitous to deny infants this right to
privacy.
The discussion below juxtaposes the treatment standards proposed by
this paper against those set forth in the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984.
1. "The Infant is Chronically and Irreversibly Comatose"
The Child Abuse statute and regulations require treatment in virtually
all cases where the infant has the potential to survive. The only concession
the Act makes to a "quality of life" standard is its recognition that treatment
can be withheld from an infant who is permanently comatose. The provi-
sions require efficacious medical treatment for any infant with the potential
to survive as a conscious being. The provisions disregard any deficit, how-
ever large, in conscious functioning, even if the infant has little or no
potential for human behavior and social interaction.
The standard proposed in this essay-"the potential of the infant for
dealing with, and responding to, sensory information, and experiencing
thought is de minimis" 4 8-provides a broader scope for non-treatment
decisions where no humane purpose would be achieved by treating the
infant. This standard would apply, for example, in cases of progressive
degenerative diseases of the brain or severe chromosome disorders. 149
Children suffering from such afflictions will barely subsist in their cots and
possess only the most basic form of consciousness or perception. It is
difficult to differentiate such cases from those of comatose patients except
that rudimentary consciousness may be accompanied by the potential for
pain and suffering, all the more reason for not fruitlessly sustaining biolog-
ical life.
2. Treatment Will "Merely Prolong Dying"
A major question raised by the Child Abuse provisions concerns the
circumstances in which treatment may be withheld from a person who is
146 See supra notes 59-77 and accompanying text.
147 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
148 See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
149 Id.
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terminally ill. The phrase "merely prolong dying"'1 50 suggests a prognosis
that the infant will die. However, the provisions do not specify how short a
lifespan will justify a non-treatment decision. The proposed rules confined
the term "to situations where death is imminent and treatment will do no
more than postpone the act of dying."' '51 Medical organizations and the
principal sponsors of the Child Abuse Amendments opposed this restric-
tive definition on the ground that it did not abide by the substantial
compromise reached in the development of the bill.
15 2
The final rules do not define "merely prolong dying," but instead offer
an interpretive, non-binding guideline. While the word "imminent" is not
used in the final rules, HHS has not altered its view that "merely prolong
dying" is inapplicable when the prognosis of death is in the "more distant,"
as distinct from "near" future and will give the infant "many years of
life. "53
This wording still leaves open the construction of the statutory term.
Omission of the word in the Joint Explanatory Statement confirms the
intentional decision of the joint sponsors not to introduce the word "immi-
nent." However, the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources
distinguishes between "infants facing imminent and unavoidable death and
other infants whose chances of survival could be improved with medical
treatment."'' 54 The Committee cited with approval the Surgeon General, C.
Everett Koop, on the question of treatment and prolonging dying: "Some
handicapped infants, unfortunately, face imminent death. For such infants
it is very important to note that we do not seek to fruitlessly prolong the
"1155process of dying ....
In discussing a number of cases where treatment had been withheld
from infants, the Committee appeared to condone decisions "made in
consideration of imminent and unavoidable death," but not those based
upon "the child's disabling condition."' 15 6 There was no express indication
.5 See supra note 122 and accompanying text. The phrase is gramatically awkward for it
suggests an extension in duration of dying. More accurately, it would read "prolong the
process of dying."
'5' Child Abuse Proposed Rules, supra note 20, at 48,164, 48,167.
152 The letter from the six principal sponsers cited in the Child Abuse Rules, supra note 7,
at 14,879 stated:
In the negotiations leading to the final language, there was much discussion about
whether or not to include the word 'imminent' in the statutory definition. It became
apparent that 'imminent' would create undue confusion both because it was ambigu-
ous and because the expected time of death cannot be predicted with precision. A
decision was made, therefore not to include 'imminent', and we urge that it be
dropped in the regulation as well.
153 Child Abuse Rules, supra note 7, at 14,890-91.
Legislative History, supra note 9, 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2925.
155 Legislative History, supra note 9, 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2926.
... Legislative History, supra note 9, 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2924.
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in the legislative history or the Joint Explanatory Statement that the term
"merely prolong dying" specifically referred to imminent death. It does
appear, however, that Congress intended that death be impending before
efficacious treatment could be withheld.' 57 There is general accord that
Congress recognized that "a few children with intensive care might live for
months, and occasionally, for years."'1 58
As suggested earlier in this essay, broader considerations for non-
treatment decisions should be applied where the infant has a severely
limited life expectancy, together with a cluster of grave, irremediable
symptoms. 159 For example, compare the approach taken under the Child
Abuse provisions with the standards proposed in this essay in the case of an
infant with Tay Sachs disease. HHS specifically used this example in the
proposed rules as a case of a terminally ill infant who should nevertheless
be aggressively medically treated.' 6 0 Most Tay Sachs infants will live less
than two years, and rarely to three or four. The overall clinical picture is
characterized by profound psychomotor retardation and relentless de-
terioration, with the child apathetic and unresponsive to exogenous stimuli.
Tay Sachs infants rarely sit or crawl. As the disease progresses, the child
suffers from blindness and seizures and eventually reaches a vegetative
state. 6 ' Given the certainty of the prognosis, the extent and gravity of the
suffering, and the absence of interactive human experiences, it is reason-
able to allow the parent, with professional advice, to make a proxy judg-
ment that treatment should be withheld. This is especially applicable if it is
an intrusive kind of treatment such as major heart surgery. Judicial review
of such decisions would be an effective and necessary safeguard for the
infant in such cases.
3. "The Treatment Would Be Virtually Futile in Terms of the Survival of
the Infant and the Treatment Itself Under the Circumstances Would Be
Inhumane"
157 Legislative History, supra note 9, 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2928 ("Where
death is imminent and inevitable, and where medical intervention merely forestalls the
inevitable, this committee acknowledges that refraining from medical intervention may be an
ethically and legally acceptable course.").
158 Legislative History, supra note 9, 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2924 (quoting Duff
& Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special Care Nursery, 289 NEw ENG. J. MED. 890
(1973)).
'19 See supra text accompanying notes 39-46.
160 Child Abuse Proposed Rules, supra note 20, at 48,164. The Department specifically
avoided using examples of specific 'diagnoses to elaborate on meaning in the Final Rules
because the addition or subtraction of particular complications would change the clinical
picture; the medical illustrations given in this essay should also be read with this understand-
ing.
161 See supra note 41. Perhaps a clearer illustration is Menkes, or Kinky Hair Syndrome
described in supra note 42. In either case, even when the child reaches coma and, as often
occurs, develops pneumonia, he or she would have to be treated with antibiotic medication
according to the Child Abuse Rules. See infra notes 163-174 and accompanying text.
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The Child Abuse Rules interpret the phrase "virtually futile in terms
of survival" to mean that treatment which is highly unlikely to prevent
death in the near future. The treatment is "inhumane" if the pain and
suffering or other medical contra-indications related to the treatment itself
clearly outweigh the slight potential benefit for an infant highly unlikely to
survive.' 6 ' Thus, pain and suffering caused by the medical condition, as
opposed to the treatment itself, could not be taken into account.
Primarily concerned with the prognosis of the infant and the efficacy,
intrusiveness, and risks of the treatment, the Child Abuse Rules express a
"medical efficacy" approach to the non-treatment decision.16 3 The Rules do
not consider any measurement of the pain or inhumanity associated with
the medical condition or disability itself.
4. All Infants Must Receive "Appropriate Nutrition, Hydration or
Medication"
Under the Child Abuse Rules all disabled infants, even if they are in an
irreversible coma or imminently dying, must receive appropriate nutrition,
hydration and medication." 4 In his evidence to the Senate Committee on
the Child Abuse Bill, the Surgeon General said that nourishment in all
cases is the "bottom line."' 65 If a hospital denies food or care, "it is child
abuse."' 6 Nourishment has an "emotional symbolism"' 6 7-feeding is an
expression of nurturing and caring, certainly for infants and children."' 68
This analysis may be correct in the case of an infant who maintains a
sucking reflex and will take nourishment voluntarily. However, those in-
fants who do not take nourishment orally must be fed artificially through
nasogastric tubes, gastrostomies, and intravenous infusions-"medical pro-
cedures with inherent risks and possible side effects, instituted by failed
health care providers to compensate for impaired physical functioning." '
The court in In re Conroy saw nasogastric and other mechanical feed-
ing as the analytical equivalent to mechanical breathing by respirator; both
procedures prolong life artificially when the body is no longer able to
perform a vital bodily function on its own.' 70 Courts have not precluded
1 2 See supra notes 125-126.
163 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
164 See supra text accompanying note 121.
165 Legislative History, supra note 9, 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2927.
166 Id.
167 Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App.3d 1006, 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,490 (1983).
16In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 372, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236 (1985).
16 Id. See also Lo & Dorntrand, Sounding Board: Guiding the Hand that Feeds: Caring for the
Demented Elderly, 311 NEW ENG.J. MED. 402 (1984); Paris & Fletcher, Infant Doe Regulations and
the Absolute Requirement to Use Nourishment and Fluids for the Dying Infant, 11 L. MED. & HEALTH
CARE 210 (1983); Steinbock, Lynn, Children, and Callahan, Must Patients Always be Given Food
and Water?, 13 HASTINGS CEN. RPT. 17 (Oct. 1983).
170ln re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 372, 486 A.2d at 1236 (1985).
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the finding that artificial sustenance of biological life may, in certain cir-
cumstances, be an invasion of a person's constitutional right to privacy."'
The decisions have been particularly mindful of the potential for pain and
other hazards associated with these procedures.
Even more problematic is the fact that the Child Abuse provisions
insist upon the use of appropriate medication in all circumstances. Dr.
Little, representing the American Academy of Pediatrics, in testimony
before the Committee, said: "Obligations to comfort and respect a dying
person remain, and infants whose lives are destined to be brief are owed
whatever enhancement and relief from suffering that can be provided,
including medication for.pain and sedation, as appropriate."' 7 2
One contradiction which arises immediately is that sedating an infant
can interfere with his or her sucking reflex, making the infant less likely to
take nourishment by mouth.' 73 Moreover, not all medication is for sedation
or the relief of pain; some combat illness or infection. If an infant is in an
irreversible coma. and, for example, develops pneumonia, it would serve no
human purpose to treat him with medication. Yet the Child Abuse provi-
sions mandate such treatment. The Quinlan court observed that the "state's
interest contra weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as the
degree of bodily invasion and the prognosis dims."' 74 While medication is
not usually an intrusive treatment, the absence of any prospect for a
conscious, sapient existence presents a strong claim effectuating the in-
fant's constitutional right to privacy.
B. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE WHICH FLOWS FROM LEGISLATION THAT
COMPELS THE TREATMENT OF HANDICAPPED INFANTS
HHS has determined that the Child Abuse Rules are not likely to result
in "an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more" or a
"significant economic impact on a substantial number" of health care pro-
viders.' 7 The Department reasons that the aggregate costs of the Rules are
7I See Barber v. Superior Court, 1437 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
,72 Legislative History, supra note 9, 4 U.S. CODE CONe. & AD. NEWS at 2927.
73See R. v. Arthur, unpublished transcript from official court reporters Marten,
Meredith & Co., Leicester Crown Court, Nov. 3-5, 1981 (an otherwise healthy Down's Syn-
drome infant was prescribed a narcotic analgesic, dihydrocodeine (DF 118), at a dosage of 5
mg, to be administered not less than every 4 hours "as required." The infant was given water,
but no nourishment, and antibiotics were withheld when broncho-pneumonia developed. Dr.
Arthur's notes read, "Parents do not wish baby to survive. Nursing care only." The doctor was
charged and acquitted of attempted murder after a long string of eminent doctors stated that
what was done was in accordance with general physician practices).174 1n re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
175 HHS is required to undertake an "impact analysis" of the Rules as provided in Exec.
Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), and the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 601-12
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only those which it generates; aggressive and costly medical care of infants
is already an established and growing feature in the United States health
care system, quite apart from the new Child Abuse provisions.17 6 In some
unknown but small proportion of cases the Rules would require treatment
that otherwise would have been withheld.
1 77
The Department's assessment of the Rules' impact on aggregate na-
tional medical costs is probably accurate. However, the Rules reinforce and
encourage a trend in health care towards expert evaluation, transfer to
specialized treatment facilities, and aggressive medical treatment to sustain
life on the margins of viability. HHS acknowledges that "prudent persons
would take care not to expose themselves to possible governmental or legal
challenge and one way to do this is to pursue treatment in cases right on the
'margin.' ",178 HHS repeatedly argues in the preamble to the Child Abuse
Rules that by adopting a constant standard of "reasonable medical judg-
ment," the Rules do not fetter reasonable medical decisions. It should be
recognized, however, that reasonable physicians operating within the re-
strictive framework of the Rules will consult not only medical criteria but
also the legal standards imposed. The vitalist tone of the Rules redefines
"reasonable medical judgment" to include specialist evaluations and ag-
gressive medical treatment. The fact that other existing rules of law and
policy already mitigate toward the practice of defensive medicine does not
change the character of these Rules as a contributing force in this direction.
Of greater concern is the emotional, financial, and social impact on
parents and families. Some will not be able to meet the costs of inordinately
expensive medical care mandated by the Child Abuse provisions because of
inadequate private insurance coverage. These families may also be con-
fronted with the inadequacy or unavailability of federal or state support
programs. This problem exists independently of the Child Abuse provi-
sions, but that provides no consolation for the tragic personal consequences
suffered when the Rules compel medical treatment which cannot be
paid. 179
Neither aggregate national costs nor personal costs to families are as
important as the life of the infant. The Federal Government has developed
(1985). In addition to aggregate and personal health care costs, there are the procedural,
training, and administrative costs to state agencies and health care facilities discussed in the
Child Abuse Rules, supra note 7, at 14,887.
176 The great majority of cases (80%) at a tertiary case center are relatively expensive
(costing an average of $8,000) but most of the rest cost $20,000 or more and some involve
hundreds of thousands of dollars. The average cost is over $20,000. Child Abuse Rules, supra
note 7, 50 FED. REG. at 14,886.
177 Child Abuse Rules, supra note 7, at 14,885-87.
178 Child Abuse Rules, supra note 7, at 14,886.
179 HHS states frankly: "We do not have statutory authority and decline to require States
to assume full financial responsibility in the maintenance and medical costs of all such disabled
children." Child Abuse Rules, supra note 7, at 14,884.
A MOMENT IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
a distinct moral posture devoted to life as an ultimate value, but it has not
considered its further moral obligation to provide resources to help ensure
some minimally tolerable quality of existence once life sustaining treatment
has been mandated. The design of a fiscally conservative but moralist
federal government, then, is to mandate highly expensive and elaborate
medical treatment to sustain the life of the most severely handicapped and
least viable of infants while at the same time demanding that health care
facilities cut costs; 8 0 it requires life long care of handicapped infants by
natural or adoptive parents or in institutions, but limits federal assistance
for health and social services for handicapped children and adults. "Vit-
alism" is based upon the worthy moral premise that life is worth preserving
at almost any cost. However, if the government wishes to "thrust life" upon
severely handicapped infants, particularly without their parents' agree-
ment, it has a concomitant moral and social responsibility to assist in
ensuring that reasonably adequate services are available to maximize the
child's developmental potential.
The ultimate human and social objective is to enable natural parents to
feel that the birth of a handicapped infant, and the decision to rear the
child in the family home, will not result in a never-ending dependency
without social help. Financial, emotional, and social support for the family
carrying the burden of caring for a handicapped person are vital to the
social fabric of any community which values the integration of handicap-
ped people. Feasible legislative programs for families with handicapped
children include holidays for the child which would allow the parents a
respite from total care; financial support to help overcome the special
health and mobility needs of the handicapped person; domiciliary assis-
tance to help meet the additional household needs of the family; and
adequate educational or occupational training during the day. Society
currently is not organized in a way which encourages local communities to
share the burden presented by the high dependency displayed by many
severely handicapped children. Good quality residential care for severely
handicapped adolescents and adults is a necessary corollary to a societal
decision to make paramount the handicapped newborn's right to life. If it is
right for the State to intervene to ensure that a handicapped neonate
should live, it also ought to ensure that individual parents of such children
do not have to rear their children without effective assistance.
VI. CONCLUSION
The new Child Abuse statute and regulations should not deter the
courts from further developing standards which recognize handicapped
180 See Stone, Sounding Board: Law's Influence on Medicine and Medical Ethics, 312 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 309, 310 (1985) ("Baby Doe" regulations impel the physician to ignore cost
and effectiveness considerations, while other recent federal and state regulations have been
aimed at creating incentives to lower health care costs).
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infants' constitutional right to privacy. These judicial standards should be
congruent with those already being developed for incompetent adults.
Since constitutional rights take precedence over statutes and regulations,
courts should be prepared to effectuate the infant's right to privacy even
where the Child Abuse provisions would require treatment including hyd-
ration, nutrition, and medication. The criteria put forward in this essay
may provide a useful signpost in developing comprehensive and coherent
standards to assess where non-treatment best serves the ward's interests.
